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DON'T DISINTEGRATE MICROSOFT (YET) 
Alan J. Meese • 
INTRODUCTION 
Outside the state of nature, cooperation is the basis of economic pro-
ductivity. Such cooperation can take many forms. Texaco "cooperates" 
with drillers it has never met when it purchases oil on the spot market. 1 It 
"cooperates" with dealers when it consents to their use of its trademark and 
promises to meet their requirements of gasoline. Dealers, in turn, might 
reciprocate by agreeing to keep certain hours, maintain clean premises, 
charge reasonable prices, and distribute only Texaco's gasoline.2 
The cooperation described thus far occurs between firms, and takes the 
form of market contracting. Much cooperation, however, occurs within 
firms, which are themselves aggregations of contracts between otherwise 
independent actors.3 Texaco, for instance, can and does purchase and own 
its own oil fields; it could also hire its own dealers and own the stations that 
distribute its products.4 By definition, all business firms are "vertically in-
tegrated" in this manner to some extent, involving, as they do, the coordi-
nation of some economic activity they could otherwise conduct by market 
contracting. 5 All firms must constantly make choices between performing 
tasks internally or relying upon the market to get the job done. Moreover, 
the "market" is not a unitary phenomenon, but instead consists of a spec-
trum of choices between "spot" transactions and long term contracting.6 
Even so-called "spot" markets are often the result of complex contractual 
arrangements between competitors.7 Not surprisingly, the choice between 
• Cabell Research Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law; J.D., University of 
Chicago; A.B., The College of William and Mary. Felicia Burton and Della Harris provided helpful 
assistance in preparation of the manuscript. 
I F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519 (1945). 
2 See Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46,49 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing such an agreement). 
3 See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972). 
4 Of course, some oil companies have done just that, owning some of the service stations that 
distribute their gasoline. See Keith K. Wollenberg, Note, An Economic Analysis of Tie-In Sales: Reex-
amining the Leverage Theory, 39 STAN. L. REv. 737, 754-55 n.114 (1987) (reporting that for many 
years Standard Oil owned all of the service stations operating under its trademark located on interstate 
highways). 
5 Steven N. S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1-5 (1983); Ronald 
H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937) (noting that "if production is regu-
lated by price movements, production could be carried on without any organisation at all."). 
6 Cheung, supra note 5, at 19; Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the 
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297,326 (1978). 
7 See RONALD H. COASE, The Firm, the Market, and the Law, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND 
THE LAW, 8-10 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 1 (1984) 
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organizing activity "within" the firm, or "on" the market depends upon an 
assessment of the relative costs and benefits of alternative arrangements, an 
assessment that may vary over time and between firms. 8 In an economy that 
is predominantly competitive, the mode of cooperation that two or more 
firms choose is presumptively beneficia1.9 
Productive cooperation is not limited to relationships between pur-
chasers and suppliers. Such cooperation can also take place between actual 
or potential competitors, often with beneficial effects. Two competitors can 
merge completely, pooling their assets and talents to form a single, more 
effective competitor. Firms can also cooperate in some respects while com-
peting in others. 10 Texaco, Skadden Arps, the Rolling Stones-all involve a 
fusion of talents that may produce more when combined than when sepa-
rate. 11 Society could "increase" competition in some sense by breaking 
Texaco (or Skadden Arps) into two, three, or four parts, but it does not, 
choosing instead to reap the benefits of cooperation between potential an-
tagonists. So long as these firms do not harm others, they should be free to 
cooperate through contract, complete integration, or otherwise. 
These principles apply in any free society and therefore to the Ameri-
can computer industry. Hewlett Packard makes PCs; it also makes printers, 
packaging both items for sale to consumers. Apple buys computer chips 
from Motorola which it then uses to make PCs; the firm also writes its own 
operating systems and software applications. 12 Like Apple, IBM makes its 
("Every market entails substantial cooperation over some domain in order to facilitate competition 
elsewhere .... Markets themselves are organized. The Chicago Board of Trade, perhaps the closest of 
modem markets to the textbook ideal, has a sheaf of rules and cooperative arrangements that reduce the 
cost of competition."). See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 241 (1918) 
(finding certain restraints ancillary to creation of Chicago Board of Trade to be reasonable); Hopkins v. 
United States, 171 U.S. 578, 603 (1898) (finding livestock exchange and various restraints ancillary to it 
lawful under the Sherman Act). 
8 COASE, supra note 5, at 390-92, 394-98. 
9 Cf ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 122-23 (1978) ("If a practice does not raise a 
question of output restriction, however, we must assume that its purpose and therefore its effect are 
either the creation of efficiency or some neutral goal."). 
10 Chicago Prof! Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597-99 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding National 
Basketball Association to be legitimate joint venture between otherwise competing entities); Rothery 
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 216-30 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (sustaining as 
reasonable joint venture bylaw that fixed minimum prices charged by members operating under ven-
ture's trademark); Nat'! Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 599-603 (I Ith Cir. 1986); 
Polk Bros. v. ForeSt City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1985) (sustaining as reasonable ancillary 
agreement among competitors that divided authority to sell different products). 
II Cf Easterbrook, supra note 7, at I ("The dichotomy between cooperation inside a 'firm' and 
competition in a 'market" is just a convenient shorthand for a far more complicated continuum. Antitrust 
law permits, even encourages, cooperation within a 'firm,' for such cooperation is the basis of economic 
productivity. But everything done within a firm could be done by market transactions as well. The 
degree of integration is variable, and some firms are integrated through many more stages of production 
than others. The firm itself is just a legal name for a complicated set of contractual arrangements among 
workers, managers, and contributors of capital."). 
12 Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., 73 F.3d 756, 761-63 (7th Cir. 1996) (analyzing 
2001) DoN'T DISINTEGRATE MICROSOFT 763 
own PCs and software. 13 Moreover, while the firm once sold CPUs and 
keyboards separate from disk drives, which independent vendors sold, it 
now makes all three items, which it "bundles" in a single product. 14 Amer-
ica Online sells access to the internet; it sells internet browsers to some, and 
purchases browsers from others. It also produces content for distribution. 
Society could increase "competition" by breaking these firms into several 
parts or preventing various forms of contractual cooperation, but such an 
approach would do more harm than good. 
The Sherman Act was not designed to interfere with productive coop-
eration. It did not, according to Justice Holmes, explode the economy into 
individual atoms, making eternal the war of all against all. 15 Quite the con-
trary, the Act rested on a recognition that protection of the right to own 
property and make legitimate contracts was the most effective guarantor of 
competition and the benefits therefrom. 16 Properly construed, the Act en-
courages cooperation--even cooperation between actual and potential 
competitors-by voiding only those practices that fall outside the legitimate 
exercise of the rights of property and contract by raising prices above the 
Digital Equipment Corporation's bundle of computers and operating systems, and noting that Apple and 
other firms engage in similar bundling). 
13 See infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
14 ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 448 F. Supp. 228, 230-32 (N.D. Cal. 1978); 
Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258,347 (N.D. Okla. 1973). 
15 N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,411 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I am happy to 
know that only a minority of my brethren adopt an interpretation of [the Sherman Act] which in my 
opinion would make eternal the bellum omnium contra omnes and disintegrate society so far as it could 
into individual atoms. If that were its intent I should regard calling such a law a regulation of commerce 
as a mere pretense. It would be an attempt to reconstruct society. I am not concerned with the wisdom of 
such an attempt, but I believe that Congress was not entrusted by the Constitution with the power to 
make it, and I am deeply persuaded that it has not tried."); id. at 361 (Brewer, J. concurring) ("Congress 
did not intend to reach and destroy those minor contracts in partial restraint of trade which the long 
course of decisions at common law had affirmed were reasonable and ought to be upheld .... Further, 
the general language of the act is also limited by the power which each individual has to manage his 
own property and determine the place and manner of its investment."). 
16 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 62 (1911) (Sherman Act was premised upon 
belief that "the freedom of the individual right to contract when not unduly or improperly exercised [is] 
the most efficient means for the prevention of monopoly, since the operation of the centrifugal and 
centripetal forces resulting from the right to freely contract [is] the means by which monopoly would be 
inevitably prevented if no extraneous or sovereign power imposed it and no right to make unlawful 
contracts having a monopolistic tendency were permitted."); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 
U.S. 106, 181 (1911) (Sherman Act "did not embrace all those normal and usual contracts essential to 
individual freedom and the right to make which were necessary in order that the course of trade might 
be free .... "); Whitwell v. Cont'l Tobacco Co., 125 F. 454, 460-61 (8th Cir. 1903) ("There is nothing 
[in the Sherman Act] which deprived any of these competitors of these rights [of contract and property]. 
If there had been, the law itself would have destroyed competition more effectively than any contracts 
or combinations of persons or of corporations could possibly have stifled it. The exercise of these un-
doubted rights is essential to the very existence of free competition .... "). See generally Alan J. Meese, 
Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era. 79 B.U. L. REV. I (1999) (demonstrating that formative era 
courts construed Sherman Act and state antitrust statutes to be consistent with liberty of contract). 
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competitive level. 17 Mergers, partnerships, joint ventures-all are presumed 
lawful, as are the (horizontal) ancillary restraints that further their legiti-
mate purposes. 18 
Courts have not always appreciated the proper scope of the Sherman 
Act or the benefits of cooperation. For decades, an inhospitality tradition 
ruled antitrust, a tradition hostile to cooperation, be it by contract or com-
plete integration. 19 The dominant economic theories of the time saw no 
beneficial purposes for such practices, which most economists instead saw 
as attempts to "leverage" or enhance a firm's market power.20 Moreover, 
17 United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568-69 (1898) (holding that the Shennan 
Act does not outlaw ordinary contracts, including mergers and the formation of partnerships, even 
though such agreements restrain trade in some sense); Meese, supra note 16, at 43-67 (asserting forma-
tive-era caselaw voided only those contracts that directly raised prices, leaving others protected by 
liberty of contract); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM: 
1870-1916, THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND POLITICS 105-17 (1988) (Congress rejected proposals to ban 
all contracts limiting competition because of constitutional concerns). As Judge Easterbrook put it 
recently: 
[A]ntitrust law permits, indeed encourages, cooperation inside a business organiza-
tion the better to facilitate competition between that organization and other produc-
ers. To say that participants in an organization may cooperate is to say that they 
may control what they make and how they sell it: the producers of Star Trek may 
decide to release two episodes a week and grant exclusive licenses to show them, 
even though this reduces the number of times episodes appear on TV in a given 
market. 
Chicago Prof! Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1996). See also United States v. Syufy 
Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 672-73 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that the competitive market thrives on firms 
"buying out competitors"). 
18 Joint Traffic Ass 'n, 171 U.S. at 568-69; United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 
280-83 (6th Cir. 1898). See also Northern Securities, 193 U.S. at 361 (Brewer, J. concurring). Judge 
Easterbrook has summarized the Sherman Act's attitude toward voluntary cooperation well: 
Cooperation is the basis of productivity. It is necessary for people to cooperate in 
some respects before they may compete in others, and cooperation facilitates effi-
cient production. Joint ventures, mergers, systems of distribution-all these and 
more require extensive cooperation, and all are assessed under a Rule of Reason 
that focuses on market power and the ability of cooperators to raise price by re-
stricting output. The war of all against all is not a good model for any economy. 
Antitrust law is designed to ensure an appropriate blend of cooperation and compe-
tition, not to require all economic actors to compete full tilt at every moment. When 
cooperation contributes to productivity through the integration of efforts, the Rule 
of Reason is the norm. 
Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted); see also Chi-
cago Prof' I Sports, 95 F.3d at 598 ("Even a single firm contains many competing interests. One division 
may make inputs for another's finished goods .... Conflicts are endemic in any multi-stage firm, such 
as General Motors or IBM."); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239-41 (1918) 
(analyzing horizontal restraint ancillary to creation of grain exchange under full blown Rule of Reason); 
Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 603 (1898) (finding livestock exchange and various restraints 
ancillary to it were not restraints of trade). 
19 Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REv. 705, 715 (1982) 
(describing inhospitality tradition of antitrust). The phrase "inhospitality tradition" was coined by Pro-
fessor Donald Turner, who was head of the Antitrust Division under President Johnson. See Stanley 
Robinson, 1968 N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Antitrust Law Symp. 29 ("I approach [vertical] restrictions not 
hospitably in the common law tradition, but inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust law.") (introducing 
and quoting Donald Turner). 
20 OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 7 (1985) (describing 
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the dominant normative theories of the era treated decentralization of power 
and liberty from contract as unalloyed goods, with little regard to the eco-
nomic effects of enforcing these policies.21 During this "populist" era, 
judges frowned on all attempts to expand firm boundaries by merger-
horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate.22 Attempts to cooperate by contract 
were also curtailed, even when such cooperation enhanced social welfare or 
lowered prices, as courts voided tying contracts, maximum resale price 
maintenance, exclusive territories, and exclusive dealing.23 According to 
these courts, the Sherman Act was meant to achieve an "open market," free 
assumptions of neoclassical price theory and their influence on industrial organization); id. at 19-26, 
370-73 (describing influence of this paradigm on antitrust thinking). Professor Coase captured the spirit 
of this era with the following statement: 
One important result of this preoccupation with the monopoly problem is that if an 
economist finds something-a business practice of one sort or another-that he 
does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as we are very ig-
norant in this field, the number of ununderstandable practices tends to be rather 
large, and the reliance upon monopoly explanation frequent. 
Ronald H. Coase, Industrial Organization: a Proposal for Research, reprinted in THE FIRM, THE 
MARKET, AND THE LAW 57, 60-61 (1988). Classic examples of this inhospitality approach include 
WilliamS. Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and its Aftermath, 81 
HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1436 (1968); Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the 
Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50 (1958). 
2l See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 612 (1972); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 
390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968) (holding maximum resale price maintenance unlawful per se even though it 
reduces prices because it "cripple[s] the freedom of traders and thereby restrain[s] their ability to sell in 
accordance with their judgment."); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274 (1966); 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) ("[W]e cannot fail to recognize Congress' 
desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned business. Congress 
appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented 
industries and markets."); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 
(1941). See also Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 
65 COLUM. L. REV. 422, 422-23 (1965) (contending that antitrust law reflects a populist tradition em-
phasizing decentralized economic power and individual freedom); Harlan M. Blake & William K. 
Jones,Jn Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 384 (1965) (arguing that antitrust policy should 
protect individuals from economic power). 
22 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581 (1967) (condemning conglomerate merger 
because, inter alia, it led to advertising efficiencies); Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. at 273-78 (condemning 
horizontal merger despite presence of over 3000 independent firms in relevant market); Brown Shoe, 
370 U.S. at 344 (condemning vertical merger in unconcentrated market because of minimal "foreclo-
sure"). 
23 See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 8 (1958) (announcing per se rule against ties 
obtained by firms with market power); Albrecht, 390 U.S. 145 passim (declaring maximum resale price 
maintenance per se unlawful); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1968) 
(holding exclusive territories per se unlawful); Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 608 (declaring horizontal 
ancillary division of territories unlawful per se despite finding by district court that such agreements 
were procompetitive); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 354-58 (1967) (same); Standard Oil 
Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 294 (1949) (holding exclusive dealing contracts involving a sub-
stantial share of the market were unlawful without consideration of justifications). 
It should be noted that the per se rule against tying contracts applied only to those agreements 
obtained by firms with market power. N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6-7. However, courts found market 
power so readily that this element had little meaningful impact. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 
371 U.S. 38, 45 n.4 (1962) (holding that, without more, possession of a copyright establishes market 
power); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 49 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding possession of attrac-
tive trademark confers market power for tying purposes). 
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courts, the Sherman Act was meant to achieve an "open market," free of the 
constraining influence of such "monopolistic" practices, thus assuring 
"competition on the merits. "24 Even intrafirm cooperation suffered, as 
courts penalized "conspiracies" between divisions of the same firm and 
invoked section 2 of the Sherman Act to thwart vertical integration and 
"predatory expansion."25 
Economic theory has evolved since this populist era. Economists and 
most antitrust lawyers now understand that various contracts and other 
practices once presumed "monopolistic" can in fact enhance the competi-
tive process by facilitating the beneficial coordination of productive activ-
ity.26 This is particularly true of vertical arrangements. Tying contracts, 
distributional restraints, and complete vertical integration-all can be 
means of overcoming the transaction costs that would otherwise result from 
reliance on contracting in the "open market," or "competition on the mer-
its.'m Some of these same advances in theory have also led to more benign 
explanations of horizontal mergers, joint ventures, and contractual re-
straints, all once deemed patently anticompetitive. 28 At the same time, most 
scholars and courts agree that "consumer welfare" is the sole objective of 
antitrust law, without regard to the decentralization of power and liberty 
24 See, e.g., Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (holding tying 
agreements presumptively unlawful because they interfere with competition on the merits); Brown Shoe, 
384 U.S. at 321 (holding that exclusive dealing contract "conflicts with the central policy of both sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act against contracts which take away freedom 
of purchasers to buy in an open market"); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 
(1959) (declaring group boycott per se unlawful absent proof of harm to consumers because the combi-
nation "takes from Klor's its freedom to buy appliances in an open competitive market ... " and "de-
prives the manufacturers and distributors of their freedom to sell to Klor's .... "). See also Perma Life 
Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); At!. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357,369-72 
( 1965) (condemning potentially "economical method of assuring efficient product distribution among 
dealers" because the practice purportedly involved the "utilization of economic power in one market to 
curtail competition in another''). 
25 Kiefer-Stewart v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951) (finding unlawful 
conspiracy between two subsidiaries of the same firm); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 
227-28 (1947) (same); United States v. ALCOA, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (finding ALCOA 
guilty of unlawfully maintaining monopoly because it increased output in response to additional de-
mand). See also Indus. Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. lnterchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 
1970) (finding a manufacturer's efficiencies-based forward integration an abuse of monopoly power). 
26 See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 20; Easterbrook, supra note 19, at 706-10, 715. 
27 See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chi-
mera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Meese, Forcing]; Alan J. Meese, Price 
Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. REV. 143 (1997) [hereinafter 
Meese, Price Theory]; Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and 
Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 430-38 (1966); Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 
U. CHI. L. REv. 886 (1981); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & 
ECON. 86 (1960). 
28 See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 461, 478-81; See also 
Timothy J. Brennan, "Vertical" Excuses for Horizontal Practices: Should There Be Any Per Se Anti-
trust Rules?, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 467 (2000). 
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from contract. 29 
As a result of these advances in theory and law, antitrust courts have 
slowly undone many of the more extreme manifestations of the inhospital-
ity tradition. 3° Courts generally refuse to second-guess the exact manner of 
cooperation that one or more firms might choose. Courts no longer con-
demn separate units of the same firm for "conspiring" with each other,3I 
and decisions to enter new lines of business or expand output on a current 
line are presumptively lawful. 32 Furthermore, courts generally refuse to 
second-guess a firm's choice between "the firm" and "the market": nearly 
all forms of cooperation, whether by contract, merger, or something in be-
tween, are presumptively lawful, and almost all survive analysis under the 
Rule of Reason. 33 
The inhospitality tradition is not dead yet, however. Indeed, the tradi-
tion is alive and well in certain antitrust doctrines embraced by the United 
States.34 Tying contracts, for instance, are unlawful per se whenever the 
29 BORK, supra, note 9, at 50-71; Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary 
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982); Cont'l 
TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1978) (rejecting concern for freedom of traders as 
a value of independent importance under the Sherman Act). 
30 Meese, supra note 28, at 474-76. 
31 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984); Chicago Profl 
Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1996). 
32 Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 710 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Vertical 
integration is a universal feature of economic life and it would be absurd to make it a suspect category 
under the antitrust laws just because it may hurt suppliers of the service that has been brought within the 
firm .... (V]ertical integration usually is procompetitive. If there are cost savings from bringing into the 
firm a function formerly performed outside it, the firm will be made a more effective competitor."); 
Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 352 n.9 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding significant market foreclosure 
does not itself doom vertical merger); In re E.l. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 731-51 
(1980) (construing precedents involving "predatory expansion" narrowly). 
33 See, e.g., State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (overturning per se ban on maximum resale 
price maintenance); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735-36 (I 988) (holding 
vertical restraints not per se illegal without agreement on price or price levels); Cont'l TV, 433 U.S. at 
58 (overturning per se ban on exclusive territories). See also, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas 
Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 216-30 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding horizontal price restraints ancillary to joint 
venture analyzed under Rule of Reason); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 
1986) (holding horizontal territorial restraints ancillary to joint venture analyzed under Rule of Reason). 
See also Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60 
ANTITRUST L.J. 67 ( 1990). 
Some have suggested that the difficulty of establishing liability under the Rule of Reason 
suggests the existence of numerous false negatives, i.e., instances in which anticompetitive restraints 
escape detection and punishment. See Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Quick Look But 
Not the Full Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 521 (2000). As I have noted elsewhere, however, the 
relative dearth of cases finding liability under the Rule of Reason is also consistent with an alternative 
hypothesis, namely, that per se rules are still somewhat overinclusive, and that the vast majority of 
contracts subject to Rule of Reason analysis are in fact procompetitive or benign. See Meese, supra note 
28, at 484 n.IOI. 
34 See Meese, supra note 28, at 476-77. By "United States," I mean the antitrust enforcement 
agencies during the period 1993-2000. Previous administrations, it should be noted, attempted to undo 
some of these doctrines. See, e.g., Meese, Forcing, supra note 27, at 48-49 (discussing government 
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defendant possesses market power.35 Minimum resale price maintenance 
and horizontal maximum price maintenance are also unlawful per se, re-
gardless whether the parties to the restraint possess market power.36 
Moreover, certain ancillary restraints, and certain practices pursued by mo-
nopolists, are presumed unlawful without any requirement that the plaintiff 
prove anticompetitive effect.37 
Although one suspects that these rules will eventually fall by the way-
side, they are still the "the law of the land," at least in the lower federal 
courts.38 Moreover, two of these doctrines played a prominent role in the 
Microsoft case, namely, the per se rule against tying and the doctrine of 
monopolization. The United States chose to rely upon these outmoded doc-
trines, and Judge Jackson faithfully followed current law regarding tying 
and monopolization. No one should have been surprised when that law led 
to a verdict for the government. 
The government, however, was not content with preventing Micro-
soft's unlawful practices. Nor was it content with behavioral relief prohib-
iting plainly lawful conduct. 39 Instead, the government sought an extraordi-
nary remedy-the disintegration of Microsoft into two new companies.40 
amicus brief in Jefferson Parish) (calling for retreat from per se rule against tying contracts). 
35 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992); Jefferson P.arish 
Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9-18 (1985). See also infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text 
(describing support by the United States in Microsoft for the per se rule against tying). 
36 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 409 (1911) (finding minimum 
resale price maintenance agreement unlawful); Bus. E/ecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 724-26 (assuming that 
minimum resale price maintenance remains unlawful per se); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 
457 U.S. 332, 342-57 (1982) (reaffirming per se rule against horizontal maximum price fixing agree-
ments). See generally Jill Bolyston Herndon & John E. Lopatka, Managed Care and the Questionable 
Relevance of Maricopa, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 117, 136-42 (1999) (describing reliance by Department 
of Justice upon Maricopa's per se rule in the healthcare context). 
37 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98-120 (1984) (declaring certain ancillary restraints 
presumptively unlawful without requiring proof of anticompetitive effect) (alternate holding); Chicago 
Prof! Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 961 F.2d 669,674-76 (7th Cir. 1992). Cf United States v. Topco Assocs., 
405 U.S. 596 passim (1972) (declaring certain restraints ancillary to legitimate venture per se unlawful). 
See also Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice Guidelines for Collaborations 
Among Competitors§ 3.3, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 13,161 at 20,856 (stating that en-
forcement agencies will presume agreements unlawful when "the likelihood of anti competitive harm is 
evident from the nature of the agreement"). See also infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text ( describ-
ing law of monopolization supported by the United States in Microsoft). 
38 State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1998) (holding lower courts are bound by Supreme Court 
precedents, even if those precedents are doomed for reversal). 
39 For instance, the remedy sought and obtained by the government prohibits Microsoft from 
entering exclusive dealing contracts with vendors of its software. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 
F. Supp. 2d 59, 68 (D.D.C. 2000). Many such contracts are perfectly lawful, however, even if entered 
into by monopolists. Indeed, the district court expressly found that Microsoft's numerous exclusive 
dealing contracts were not unlawful under section I of the Sherman Act. United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30,51-54 (D.D.C. 2000). 
40 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgment at 20-24, Microsoft (No. 98-
1232) (arguing for "reorganization" of Microsoft into two different entities), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f4600/4642.htm. See also Plaintiffs' Revised Proposed Final Judgment, 
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Under the terms of the government's proposal, one firm, dubbed "OpCo," 
would develop and market the firm's Windows operating system and any 
other subsequently developed operating systems.4 I The other, dubbed "Ap-
pCo," would house the firm's applications, including Internet Explorer, 
Microsoft Office, and others.42 While the proposed remedy would allow the 
firms to cooperate by contract, the terms of such cooperation would be set 
by decree and subjected to judicial oversight.43 In pressing for this relief, 
the government sought to undo cooperation, in the form of vertical integra-
tion, that has produced an operating system and applications software that 
have thrived in the marketplace. In its place, the government would substi-
tute its own approved form of contractual collaboration. 
The government's request for relief rested upon various assumptions 
regarding the effect of Microsoft's unlawful conduct, as well as predictions 
about the consequences of divestiture.44 Among other things, the govern-
ment claimed that disintegration of Microsoft would have no efficiency 
implications and might even enhance the welfare of the firm's stockholders. 
Naturally, Microsoft has taken issue with these assumptions. Both sides, as 
well as amici, supported their positions with lengthy affidavits and offers of 
proof regarding the consequences of the government's remedy.45 Never-
theless, Judge Jackson rejected Microsoft's request for a hearing to explore 
these competing contentions and granted the government's request in toto. 
In so doing, he made no findings of fact; nor did he discuss or evaluate the 
various legal and economic theories the government proffered in support of 
its relief.46 Instead, he held that the government deserved deference because 
of its expertise, and was presumptively entitled to the relief it sought. 47 
Judge Jackson did not cite any authority for the proposition that vic-
tory "on the merits" presumptively entitles the government to the remedy of 
Microsoft (No. 98-1232), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f4800/4894.htm. 
41 Plaintiffs' Revised Proposed Final Judgment at 2-3; id. at 13-16 (defining Applications Busi-
ness and Operating System Business). 
42 /d. at 13-16. 
43 /d. at 3-5 (proposing provisions governing contractual and other relationships between OpCo 
and AppCo). 
44 See infra notes 54-85 and accompanying text. 
45 For instance, the government supported its proposal with a memorandum of law as well as 
affidavits by economists, software experts, and financial experts. Microsoft countered with a memoran-
dum of its own, supported by affidavits by economic, financial, and software experts. Amici Curiae also 
made substantial submissions. See, e.g., Breakup And Compulsory Licensing: Remedies Or Bad Medi-
cine? (30 page white paper submitted by Amici Association for Competitive Technology and Sidley & 
Austin), available at http://www.actonline.org/pubs/paper.pdf.; see also Proposal of the Association for 
Competitive Technology for Establishment of an Orderly Procedure for Public Participation on the 
Issue of Remedies, Microsoft (No. 98-1232), available at http://www.a~tonline.org/ 
events/motionbrief.asp. 
46 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000). 
47 /d. at 62 ("Plaintiffs won the case, and for that reason alone have some entitlement to a remedy 
of their choice."). 
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its choice. And, there is significant authority at least suggesting that there is 
no such presurnption.48 To be sure, the Supreme Court has said that courts 
should resolve "doubts" in favor of the prevailing party.49 However, one 
cannot have "doubts," in any meaningful sense, until one actually considers 
the contending evidence.50 As shown below, consideration of the parties' 
contentions should have led the district court to reject the government's 
plea for disintegration, at least absent further factual findings. The district 
court's fmdings of fact, copious as they are, do not justify the sort of ex-
treme interference, requested by the government, in Microsoft's legitimate 
exercise of its property rights.51 In fact, by choosing to rely at trial upon 
outmoded doctrines that reflect the inhospitality tradition, the government 
avoided any requirement to prove that Microsoft's unlawful tactics actually 
reduced competition in the relevant market. Thus, the government's own 
trial strategy ensured the absence of the sort of factual findings that might 
have justified the extraordinary relief that it now seeks. Absent additional 
proceedings, such interference with presumptively beneficial integration 
cannot be justified. 
I. THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE FOR DISINTEGRATION 
Like IBM and Apple, Microsoft designs and writes operating systems 
48 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 250-51 (1968) (holding that trial 
courts may consider means of remedying monopoly less drastic than disintegration sought by the gov-
ernment); see also supra note 45 (collecting authorities rejecting remedies proposed by the government 
after victory on the merits). 
49 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 575 (1972). 
50 Indeed, Judge Jackson seemed to believe that such findings were impossible or useless. Micro-
soft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 62 ("In its experience the Court has found testimonial predictions of future events 
generally less reliable even than testimony as to historical fact, and cross-examination to be of little use 
in enhancing or detracting from their accuracy."). Such epistemological pessimism, however, is no basis 
for refusing to investigate contending good faith claims about the effect of a proposed remedy. The 
question whether the disintegration or integration of two firms will enhance or detract from competition 
necessarily requires a predictive judgment, of the sort that antitrust courts often make. Brown Shoe Co. 
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962) (finding that merger analysis requires analysis of probabili-
ties). The difficulty of such an analysis does not dispense with its necessity. United States v. Falstaff 
Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 566-67 n.l9 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (1923) ("If justice requires the fact to be ascertained, the difficulty of 
doing so is no ground for refusing to try."). Judge Jackson's apparent refusal to give serious considera-
tion to Microsoft's legal and factual arguments against disintegration and resulting abdication to the 
Department of Justice would seem to offend the bedrock principle that the ultimate decisionmaker must 
actually consider the evidence before depriving a defendant of liberty or property. See Morgan v. United 
States, 298 U.S. 468,481 (1936) ("The one who decides must hear."). 
51 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32,46 (1918) (stating that remedy of disso-
lution and separation of monopolist into competing units "is extreme, even in its mildest demands"); 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 78 (1911) (courts crafting antitrust remedies must keep in 
mind that "injury to the public by the prevention of an undue restraint on, or the monopolization of trade 
or commerce is the foundation upon which the prohibitions of the statute rest, and moreover that one of 
the fundamental purposes of the statute is to protect, not to destroy, rights of property.") (emphasis 
added). 
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and various applications. Most notably, Microsoft is the proud author of the 
Windows operating system, along with the Internet Explorer (IE) browser 
and the Microsoft Office Suite, a package of word processing applications 
including Microsoft Word and Excel. Like other forms of cooperation in 
the software industry, the intrafirm cooperation that brought us Microsoft 
Word and IE is presumptively procompetitive, just like the cooperation 
within IBM that brought us OS/2 and numerous compatible applicationsY 
Indeed, this is the very sort of cooperation that the antitrust laws protect and 
encourage, by prohibiting only those practices that interfere with the 
workings of the marketplace in a manner that enhances consumer prices. 53 
Nevertheless, the government sought to undo this cooperation, and Judge 
Jackson complied with its request. 
The government does not assert that the intrafirm cooperation that 
produced IE, Microsoft Office, or any other Microsoft applications itself 
violated the Sherman Act. Nor has the government tried to rebut the well-
founded presumption that such cooperation produced benefits for consum-
ers. 54 The government's case for disintegration is far more subtle, and cen-
ters around its attempt to engineer the evolution of so-called "middleware," 
that is, an application that can support other applications. By forcing Mi-
crosoft to divest its application business, it is said, the remedy proposed by 
the government will create a firm with the ability and incentive necessary to 
develop middleware, thus undermining the monopoly that Microsoft unlaw-
fully maintained.55 
How will the creation of a rniddleware firm remedy Microsoft's un-
lawful maintenance of monopoly power in the market for operating sys-
tems? The government argued, and the district court found, that the relevant 
market did not include middleware. 56 Creation of a middleware firm, then, 
would not itself alter Microsoft's market share or resulting market power. 
Still, according to the government, middleware has the potential to undo 
Microsoft's monopoly by lowering a barrier to entry that purportedly pro-
tects it. To understand how this could occur, it is necessary to review 
briefly the government's theory, adopted by the district court, about the 
nature and source of Microsoft's apparent market power. 
Consumers do not buy computers and operating systems for their own 
52 United States v. Microsoft Corp. 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, ~ 115 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting that IBM 
currently markets a "SmartSuite bundle of office productivity applications as an alternative to Micro-
soft's Office suite."). 
53 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
54 See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text. 
55 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgment, at 32-35, United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232). 
56 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36-37 (D.D.C. 2000) (defining relevant 
market as "lntel-compatible PC operating systems"); United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, ~ 29 
(D.D.C. 1999) (finding that, even in best case scenario, "it would take several years for middleware ... 
to constrain the pricing of [lntel-based PC operating systems]."). 
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sake-they instead purchase them as "platforms" on which to run applica-
tions, like browsers, word processing software, and games. The develop-
ment of such applications involves substantial upfront, fixed costs, in what 
is essentially the research and development of a complex software 
program. 57 Because more consumers use Windows than any other operating 
system, Independent Software Vendors (ISVs) are more likely to write ap-
plications compatible with the Windows operating system than, for in-
stance, IBM's OS/2 or Linux.58 As a result, any firm that offers a compet-
ing operating system finds itself at an immediate disadvantage vis a vis 
Microsoft. 59 Indeed, the government continually claimed at trial, and the 
district court found, that there are about 70,000 applications available that 
are compatible with Windows 98, and only about 12,000 that are compati-
ble with the operating system with the next largest base of users.60 These 
and other factors led the district court to conclude that "Intel-based PC op-
erating systems" comprised the relevant market, as a monopolist of such 
operating systems could profitably maintain a significant price increase, 
given the absence of other operating systems that consumers deemed to be 
close substitutes.61 
Of course, mere possession of a large share of a relevant market does 
not by itself establish the existence of monopoly power. 62 The district court 
also found that a significant barrier to entry protects this share.63 In par-
ticular, the court found that a new entrant that offered an Intel-based PC 
57 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 'II 38 ("Software development is characterized by substantial 
economies of scale. The fixed costs of producing software, including applications, is very high."). 
58 !d. at 'II 41 ("In deciding whether to develop an application for a new operating system, an 
ISV's first consideration is the number of users it expects the operating system to attract."). 
59 !d. at 'II 30 ("The overwhelming majority of consumers will only use a PC operating system for 
which there already exists a large and varied set of high-quality, full-featured applications, and for 
which it seems relatively certain that new types of applications and new versions of existing applica-
tions will continue to be marketed at pace with those written for other operating systems."). 
60 ld. at '1!40 (finding that Windows "supports over 70,000 applications"); id. at '\147 (noting that 
"Apple's Mac OS supports more than 12,000 applications"); id. at 'II 46 (finding that, "at its peak, 
[IBM's] OS/2 ran approximately 2,500 applications and had I 0% of the market for Intel-compatible PC 
operating systems"). But see Richard McKenzie, Microsoft's "Applications Barrier to Entry": The 
Missing 70,000 Programs, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 380 (Aug. 3I, 2000) (arguing that the 
70,000 figure vastly overstates the number of unique applications available for Windows), available at 
http://www .cato.org/pubs/pas/pa380.pdf. 
61 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at '1120 (finding that, for instance, current owners of Intel-based PCs 
would face significant costs in switching to non-Intel operating systems); id. at '11'11 24-26 (finding that 
network computers are not a reasonable substitute for Intel-based PCs); id. at '1121 (finding that "relative 
dearth of applications written to run on the Mac OS" suggested that few consumers would substitute to 
an Apple OS in the face of a significant increase in the price oflntel-based PC Operating Systems). 
62 United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1990); Ball Mem'l Hosp. v. Mut. 
Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325, 1336-37 (7th Cir. 1986). 
63 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at '11'1136-52. Indeed, the goverrunent and the district court could have 
pushed this logic even further. Given its larger installed base that supports the proliferation of Win-
dows-based applications, it would seem that Windows is itself a relevant market, in which Microsoft 
has a 100% share. 
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operating system would find itself at a severe disadvantage vis a vis Micro-
soft, unless it could somehow ensure the availability of tens of thousands of 
compatible applications.64 
Enter N etscape, which in 1994 had a monopoly share of the market for 
a vital software application-internet browsers. Netscape was a "killer" 
application.65 Almost everyone who buys a PC wants to browse the inter-
net, and they need a browser to do so. Netscape's Navigator was compati-
ble with fifteen different operating systems, and was the browser of choice, 
with about eighty percent of the market.66 Moreover, unlike most other ap-
plications, Netscape had the potential to evolve into "middleware."67 More 
precisely, Netscape had begun to include with Navigator software code 
known as APis-application programming interfaces-that provided a 
template to which ISVs could write software applications.68 Although early 
versions of Navigator included relatively few APis, Netscape resolved ul-
timately to include an API set that would rival that contained in Windows.69 
At the same time, Sun Microsystems was creating a sort of middle-
ware of its own. In particular, Sun was developing Java, a programming 
language that could empower ISV s to write once and nevertheless know 
that their applications would run on any operating system. 70 Merely writing 
a program in the Java language, however, would not ensure that an applica-
tion ran "cross-platform." Instead, applications written in Java would only 
run on PCs that contained so-called Java Class Libraries-APis on which 
ISVs writing in Java could rely, as well as a so-called Java Virtual Ma-
chine, which helped translate Java software code into instructions compre-
64 !d. at 'U 40 ("To provide a viable substitute for Windows, another PC operating system would 
need a large and varied enough base of compatible applications to reassure consumers that their interests 
in a variety, choice, and currency would be met to more-or-less the same extent as if they chose Win-
dows."); id. at 'U'U 45-47 (finding that IBM and Apple were not viable substitutes for Windows because 
of the relative absence of applications compatible for these operating systems). 
65 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgment at 16, United States v. Micro-
soft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232); see also Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 'U 69 
("Netscape Navigator possesses three key middleware attributes that endow it with the potential to 
diminish the applications barrier to entry."). 
66 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 'U 69; id. at 'U 360 (finding that Netscape's share of the browser 
market was "above eighty percent" in January 1996). This is not to say that Netscape possessed "mo-
nopoly power" for purposes of section 2 of the Sherman Act. Such a conclusion would require the 
identification of some barrier to entry not apparent from the record. Nonetheless, the government 
seemed to believe that, but for Microsoft's campaign against it, Netscape would have maintained a 
dominant share of the market for this brand new product indefinitely. See infra notes 75-78 and accom-
panying text. 
67 !d. at 'U'U 69, 76-77. 
68 !d.; id. at 'U 68 (defining middleware). 
69 !d. at 'U 77 (finding that as of 1998, Navigator and JavaClass Libraries combined had fewer 
than I 000 AP!s, compared to about I 0,000 for Windows 98). 
70 !d. at 'U 74 ("The inventors of Java at Sun Microsystems intended the technology to enable 
applications written in the Java language to run on a variety of platforms with minimal porting."). 
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hensible to the underlying operating system. 71 Microsoft apparently refused 
to distribute the Java Class Libraries and the Java Virtual Machine along 
with Windows.72 In 1995, however, Netscape agreed to include Java Class 
Libraries as well as the Java Virtual Machine along with its Navigator 
browser. 73 Sun, however, was far from its goal of including enough APis in 
its Java Class Libraries to allow for a true "write once, run anywhere" envi-
ronment.74 
Had Netscape and/or Sun been successful, the story goes, ISVs could 
have written applications that would run on any PC that included Netscape, 
essentially bypassing the underlying operating system.75 Because Netscape 
would have been present on so many desktops, it would have changed fun-
damentally the economics of software application development, as ISVs 
could write a single version of an application, confident that it would run 
on the vast majority of PCs, without regard to the identity of the underlying 
operating system. 76 As a result, the number of applications written to run on 
Netscape and/or Java would have dwarfed the number written for Apple's 
Mac OS or IBM's OS/2, thus bringing down the applications barrier to en-
try. In such an environment, firms seeking to enter the operating systems 
market could do so confident that a significant pool of applications written 
to run on Netscape (or Java) would be compatible with their system, re-
gardless of the new entrant's own market share. 
The government contends that Microsoft took various unlawful steps 
that advantaged its own browser and undermined Netscape's dominant 
share of the browser market.77 By driving Netscape from the desktop of 
most PCs, it is said, Microsoft helped maintain its own monopoly by un-
dermining Netscape's threat to the applications barrier to entry. As Net-
scape' s share of the browser market fell, the government claims, so too did 
the chance that ISVs would write applications that ran on Netscape. And, 
without any assurance that ISVs would, in fact, write applications that ran 
on its browser, Netscape lost the requisite incentive to add to its browser 
the thousands of APis that were necessary to support a wide range of appli-
cations. At the same time, Microsoft allegedly took various steps that un-
dermined Sun's Java strategy. According to the government, Microsoft's 
unlawful actions "raised" and then "maintained" the applications barrier to 
71 /d. at~ 73. 
72 /d. at~ 76. 
73 /d. 
74 /d. at ~ 77. 
75 It should be noted that Java could have been successful without Netscape, if it could have 
found a different vehicle for distributing the Java Class Libraries and the Java Virtual Machine. 
76 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at~~ 29, 68-70; id. at~ 74 (describing Java's "write once, run any-
where" strategy). 
77 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgment at 15-24, United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232) (summarizing government's conten-
tions). 
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entry, thus entrenching Microsoft's status as a monopolist. 78 
The mere fact that Microsoft employed unlawful tactics that main-
tained its monopoly power, however, does not justify disintegration of the 
firm. 79 Moreover, even if the government could articulate a persuasive ra-
tionale for divestiture of Microsoft's browser business, such a rationale 
would not in any way provide a basis for disintegration of Microsoft's en-
tire applications business. Why, then, should the district court disintegrate 
Microsoft? According to the government, such a breakup would be the 
most logical way of restoring the prospect of middleware competition, and 
thus would deprive Microsoft of the fruits of its anticompetitive acts- the 
monopoly power it purportedly enjoys because it "raised" and "maintained" 
the applications barrier to entry.80 In particular, the government asserts that, 
unlike Microsoft's current applications business, an independent applica-
tions company that owns Microsoft's various applications would have in-
centives to develop the sort of middleware that Netscape and Java failed to 
produce. 81 Most importantly, the United States points out that Microsoft 
Office-a bundle of a few word processing applications-may well be a 
candidate for middleware, just as Netscape was in 1995.82 Most people who 
purchase PCs also want word processing capability and Office is by far the 
most popular bundle of such applications.83 Once separated from the cur-
rent Microsoft, AppCo could add thousands of APis to Office, thus devel-
oping middleware with a "built in" installed base. 84 Spinning off a separate 
AppCo could thus restore the competitive landscape that existed before 
Microsoft embarked on its predatory attack on Netscape and Java.85 
78 /d. at 15 (stating that Microsoft's tactics "raised entry barriers"); see also id. at 18 (stating that 
Microsoft took various steps to "increase entry barriers"); id. at 19 (same); id. at 22 (same). 
79 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 346-51 (D. Mass. 1953) ajf'd, 
347 U.S. 521 (1954) (refusing to grant government's request to disintegrate monopolist that had main-
tained its power by unlawful means); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 91 F. Supp. 333, 416-19 
(S.D.N.Y. 1950) (same). 
80 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgment at 18-22, Microsoft (No. 98-
1232). 
81 Id. at 19-21. 
82 /d. at 34 ("Office has all three of the characteristics that made Netscape such a potent threat to 
Microsoft's operating system monopoly: It can support AP!s and thus be a platform for other applica· 
tions; it could function on multiple operating systems; and it is a 'killer application' in that it provides 
functions that nearly everyone needs.") (internal citations omitted). 
83 /d. at 28 (contending that Microsoft Office "has been dominant in its category since 1993, and 
[that] about 80 percent of all electronic information in most companies is stored in Office documents."). 
84 /d. at 33-55. 
85 /d. The government does not seek to justify disintegration solely on the grounds that this rem-
edy may result in the creation of middleware. It also argues, for instance, that an independent AppCo 
would be more likely to "port" applications like Word and other components of Microsoft Office to 
operating systems such as Linux that compete with Windows, thus undermining the applications barrier. 
Id. at 19. As noted earlier, however, the district court did not explain on which ground or grounds it was 
granting relief, so there are no findings about whether, in fact, such porting would occur. See supra 
notes 45-50 and accompanying text. At any rate, it does not appear that such porting could have any 
appreciable effect on the applications barrier to entry. As one of Microsoft's experts points out, Micro-
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II. WHERE'S THE PROOF? 
As explained above, the government justifies the harsh remedy of dis-
integration on the ground that such relief can lower the application barrier 
to entry that Microsoft purportedly "raised" and then "maintained" by 
means of its anti competitive conduct. 86 In so doing, the government claims 
that mere behavioral relief will not suffice:87 The government's argument 
fails for three independent reasons. First, the government has not shown 
soft has ported Office and related programs to Apple's Mac OS, without thereby rendering Macintosh a 
substitute for Windows. See Declaration of Dr. Stan Liebowitz at 13-14, Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 50 
(D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232), available at http://www.neramicrosoft.com/level_l/nera_tt.htm. Indeed, 
at trial the government argued, and the district court found, that operating systems like Macintosh could 
not hope to compete with Windows because of the dearth of applications available for such non-
Windows systems. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at~ 21 ("consumer demand for Apple PC systems suffers 
on account of the relative dearth of applications written to run on the MAC OS."). The government 
cannot have it both ways: it cannot claim that a firm contemplating entry into the operating system 
market must be assured of tens of thousands of compatible applications while at the same time asserting 
that porting a package of a few applications will appreciably lower the applications barrier. See, e.g., 
Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1547-49 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents party who prevailed under one version of the facts to assert con-
trary version in same or subsequent litigation). At any rate, even if such porting could have such a 
powerful effe:;ct, there would be no basis for an order of disintegration, as the court could achieve the 
very same purposes simply by ordering porting. The balance of this paper will therefore focus on the 
government's assertion that disintegration of Microsoft can introduce middleware and thus lower the 
applications barrier to entry. 
86 The government begins its legal argument in favor of disintegration in this case with a quote 
from United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 330-31 ( 1961) for the proposition 
that "divestiture is 'the most important of antitrust remedies. It is simple, relatively easy to administer, 
and sure."' See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgment at 31, Microsoft (No. 
98-1232). This quotation is entirely inapposite, however. DuPont dealt with a divestiture of stock which 
the defendant had purchased in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. It did not involve the dismem-
berment of a unitary corporate structure the creation of which was presumptively procompetitive. 
Moreover, the government has wrenched the quotation in question from the midst of a paragraph that 
was only concerned with the appropriateness of divestiture of stock purchased in violation of section 7. 
The paragraph is worth quoting in full, with the two sentences quoted by the government in bold. 
It cannot be gainsaid that complete divestiture is peculiarly appropriate in cases of 
stock acquisition that violate § 7. That statute is specific and 'narrowly directed,' 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,312 (1949), and it outlaws a par-
ticular form of economic control-stock acquisitions which tend to create a monop-
oly of any line of commerce. The very words of§ 7 suggest that an undoing of the 
acquisition is a natural remedy. Divestiture or dissolution has.traditionally been the 
remedy for Sherman Act violations whose heart is intercorporate combination and 
control, and it is reasonable to think immediately of the same remedy when § 7 of 
the Clayton Act, which particularizes the Sherman Act standard of illegality, is in-
volved. Of the very few litigated § 7 cases which have been reported, most decreed 
divestiture as a matter of course. Divestiture has been called the most important 
of antitrust remedies. It is simple, relatively easy to administer, and sure. It 
should always be in the forefront of a court's mind when a violation of§ 7 has been 
found. 
DuPont, 366 U.S. at 328-31 (emphases added). See also Ford, 405 U.S. at 573 (citing DuPont for the 
proposition that "[ c ]omplete divestiture is particularly appropriate where asset or stock acquisitions 
violate the antitrust laws."). 
87 Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Support Of Proposed Final Judgment at 7-8, Microsoft (No. 98-
1232) (summarizing government's assertion that behavioral relief will not suffice). 
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that Microsoft's unlawful conduct-as opposed to its perfectly lawful and 
procompetitive development and marketing of IE---deprived Netscape of its 
dominant share of the internet browser market. Instead, by relying upon 
outmoded doctrines regarding tying and monopolization, the government 
absolved itself of any obligation to prove that Microsoft's unlawful tactics 
had the effect that the government now claims. Second, the government did 
not prove that, but for Netscape's failure to maintain its status as the domi-
nant browser, Netscape would have in fact evolved into middleware of the 
sort that would have undermined the applications barrier to entry. Nor did 
the government prove that Sun's Java middleware strategy would have 
been successful. Third, even if the government could show that Microsoft's 
unlawful tactics were primarily responsible for the failure of Netscape 
and/or Java to evolve into middleware, thereby lowering the applications 
barrier, the government did not show that disintegration of Microsoft is 
necessary to enhance competition. There were, and are, numerous other 
candidates for middleware, and the district court awarded behavioral relief 
designed to prevent Microsoft from interfering with the entry of such mid-
dleware into the marketplace. As a result, the remedy proposed by the gov-
ernment will not further legitimate purposes that behavioral relief would 
not otherwise accomplish. 
It may be tempting to order disintegration in any event, on the off 
chance that the division of Microsoft will introduce middleware competi-
tion that otherwise would not have occurred. Anything is possible. Yet, one 
cannot justify the disintegration of a going concern based on the mere pos-
sibility that such action will produce competitive benefits. While the inhos-
pitality tradition presumed the absence of benefits from vertical integration, 
most economists and antitrust lawyers now know better, recognizing that 
such integration often creates significant benefits. Absent some showing by 
the government that the various benefits of integration profferred by Micro-
soft do not exist, the firm should remain intact. 
A. Did Microsoft Unlawfully "Raise" or "Maintain " the Applications 
Barrier? 
The assertion that Microsoft "raised" or "increased" the applications 
barrier in any sense that would justify antitrust relief is plainly false. The 
applications barrier was the natural result of Windows' wide acceptance in 
the marketplace, as well as Microsoft's (procompetitive) efforts to encour-
age the production of Windows-compatible applications. 88 Indeed, when 
88 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, ~ 39 (D.D.C. 1999) ("The main reason that 
demand for Windows experiences positive network effects, however, is that the size of Windows' 
installed base impels ISVs to write applications first and foremost to Windows, thereby ensuring a large 
body of applications from which consumers can choose."); id. at~ 44 ("Microsoft works closely with 
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defending an earlier consent decree that it had negotiated with Microsoft, 
the government expressly stated that the firm had obtained its monopoly 
position lawfully-by accident and perhaps superior business acumen.89 
This position of lawful monopoly-and not any anticompetitive conduct-
led ISVs to write tens ofthousands of applications to run on Windows.90 Of 
course, the availability of these applications helped to fortify Microsoft's 
position, and contributed to its attainment of monopoly power. But this is 
just another way of saying that any given form of operating system soft-
ware is characterized by increasing returns in consumption, at least given 
the current state of software technology.91 
This is exactly the position the government took when it defended its 
decision not to pursue Microsoft's acquisition of monopoly power.92 Ulti-
mately, then, the government's claim that Microsoft "raised" the applica-
tions barrier to entry boils down to an assertion that possession of a mo-
nopoly protected by barriers to entry can somehow form the basis for the 
firm's disintegration.93 Yet, without more, possession of a monopoly forti-
ISVs to help them adapt their applications to the newest version of the operating system"); id. at 'II 43 
(noting that Microsoft spends "hundreds of millions of dollars ... each year inducing ISVs to write 
applications for Windows."). 
89 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("The government did 
not allege and does not contend-and this is of crucial significance to this case-that Microsoft ob-
tained its alleged monopoly position in violation of the antitrust laws. The government believes that 
Microsoft's initial acquisition of monopoly power in the operating systems market was the somewhat 
fortuitous result of IBM choosing for its PCs the operating system introduced by Microsoft ("MS-
DOS"), which, with Microsoft's successful exploitation of that advantage, led Microsoft to obtain an 
installed base on millions of IBM, and IBM-compatible, PCs."); Brief For Appellant United States of 
America at 4, Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (No. 95-5037) ("By June 1994, the Department had reached two 
principal conclusions [as a result of its investigation). First, there was no basis for an antitrust challenge 
to Microsoft's acquisition of monopoly power in the market for operating system software for IBM-
compatible personal computers; the government concluded that this had resulted from Microsoft's 
obtaining an enormous installed base on millions of personal computers ("PCs") through its successful 
exploitation of its initial advantage as IBM's chosen PC operating system."). The government's expert, 
Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow, agreed. "Clearly, the six-fold growth in the installed base [of consum-
ers using Microsoft's operating system] is primarily the result of the extraordinary commercial success 
of the IBM-compatible PC platform, in which Microsoft's product development and marketing played a 
part." Declaration of Kenneth Arrow at II, Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (No. 95-5037). 
90 The district court did not hold or suggest that Microsoft "raised" or otherwise created the 
applications barrier to entry. Instead, the court suggested the Microsoft attempted to "protect" the 
barrier and to prevent others from "diminishing" it. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at '1)'1)407-11. This finding 
is consistent with the court's assumption that Microsoft obtained its monopoly honestly, without en-
gaging in any predatory tactics. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
91 Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1452 ("It is undisputed that the software market is characterized by 
'increasing returns,' resulting in natural barriers to entry."). See also, e.g., David Evans & Richard 
Schmalensee, A Guide to the Antitrust Economics of Networks, 10 ANTITRUST 36 (1996) (contending 
that "network externalities" can arise where increasing demand for the product in question "spur[s] the 
demand [and production of] complementary products."). 
92 See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. 
93 The government seems to assert that Microsoft's campaign against Netscape itself raised the 
applications barrier. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. Netscape, however, never did 
constitute middleware of the sort that could lower the applications barrier; the "height" of the barrier 
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fied by such natural competitive advantages does not give rise to liability 
under the Sherman Act.94 To be sure, the government adduced "more;" it 
proved that the firm maintained its monopoly and violated section 2 after it 
acquired monopoly power. As already noted, however, any decision to 
dismember the company must rest on more than that.95 The government's 
position-that business success and naturally resulting "barriers to entry" 
taken together justify the extraordinary remedy of divestiture-is unprece-
dented and would radically expand the availability of such relief. After all, 
the lawful acquisition of a monopoly necessarily excludes less efficient 
firms and almost always calls forth various competitive advantages-in-
cluding the goodwill that naturally accrues to a successful firm-that com-
petitors and others would characterize as "barriers to entry."96 The govern-
ment's position, then, would require divestiture in most cases in which a 
firm improperly maintained an otherwise lawful monopoly, regardless 
was thus unaffected by Netscape's presence. Thus, removal of Netscape as a potential author of mid-
dleware did not "increase" any barrier. 
94 See Ala. Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536, 947-49 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Mark A. 
Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1068 (1996) 
("applying section 2 to a standardized software market with a single dominant firm arguably does not fit 
very well with existing precedent. ... While in the ordinary case control of a market by a single firm 
may raise section 2 concerns, in this case the monopolist may have some legitimate claim that its mo-
nopoly has been 'thrust upon it' and is therefore not illegal under the rule of United States v. Aluminum 
Company of America (ALCOA)."). 
95 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
96 See generally Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 947-49. Of course, there is a respectable argument 
that such goodwill should not be deemed a barrier to entry in the first place, since it is the natural result 
of the sort of competitive process that the antitrust laws encourage. United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 
743 F.2d 976, 984 (2d Cir. 1984) ("We fail to see how the existence of good will achieved through 
effective service is an impediment to, rather than the natural result of, competition."). See also Steams 
Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 531 (5th Cir. 1999); Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia News-
papers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1202-03 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that without more, reputation cannot be 
deemed a "barrier to entry" for antitrust purposes); United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 669 
(9th Cir. 1990). See generally GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968) (de-
fining entry barriers as any cost of production borne by new entrants that is or was not borne by incum-
bents); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 553 (1999) ("Nothing is a more effective 
barrier to entry than a firm's capacity to produce a high quality product at a low price, or to provide 
improved service to customers."). Regardless whether such goodwill is properly deemed a barrier to 
entry for antitrust purposes, there is no economically meaningful basis for distinguishing this business 
advantage from other advantages associated with monopoly, including the widespread availability of 
complements that constitutes the "applications barrier to entry." Indeed, some commentators have 
argued that antitrust law should be less concerned with the sort of "barriers to entry" generated by 
network effects. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic 
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479, 503-04 (1998) ("Network effects are an inherent part of certain markets, 
not a 'market failure' for which the law must necessarily correct. ... Antitrust law is properly con-
cerned in non-network markets with high barriers to entry .... Strong network effects are themselves a 
barrier to entry, though it is not at all clear that entry into such a market ought to be encouraged."); 
Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 91, at 39 (arguing that dominance in industries characterized by 
network effects is more fragile than in other industries with the result that there is no rationale for ex-
ceptionally close antitrust scrutiny of monopolists in such markets). Thus, there is no way to limit the 
government's argument on this score to those cases involving an "applications barrier to entry," as 
opposed to other types of barriers. 
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whether less intrusive remedies were equally effective. If accepted, such a 
position would essentially punish success, contravening ninety years of 
section 2 precedent holding that, without more, mere size is not a concern 
under the Act.97 Even monopolists are allowed to compete, and success in 
the competitive struggle is not a "barrier to entry" that justifies extraordi-
nary relief.98 
97 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985); United 
States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417,444 (1920); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 
U.S. I, 62 (1911) (noting that Sherman Act does not forbid "monopoly in the concrete"). See also 
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan Enters., 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) ("The purpose of the [Sherman] 
Act is not to protect businesses from the working of the market; it is to protect the public from the 
failure of the market. The law directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, 
but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself.") (emphasis added); Cargill, Inc. 
v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. I 04, 116 ( 1986) ("[I]t is in the interest of competition to permit 
dominant firms to engage in vigorous competition .... ") (quoting Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. 
Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1057 (6th Cir. 1984)); Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d 547-49; United States v. 
ALCOA, 148 F .2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) ("[T]he Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those 
very forces which it is its prime object to foster: finis opus coronat. The successful competitor, having 
been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins."); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Ko-
dak, Inc., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[A]Iarge firm does not violate § 2 simply by reaping the 
competitive rewards attributable to its efficient size, nor does an integrated business offend the Sherman 
Act whenever one of its departments benefits from association with a division possessing monopoly in 
its own market."); Declaration of Kenneth Arrow at 4, Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (No. 95-5037) ("A rule 
of penalizing market successes that are not the result of anticompetitive practices will, among other 
consequences, have the effect of taxing technological improvements and is unlikely to improve welfare 
in the long run."). 
98 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 346-48 (D. Mass. 1953), ajJ'd, 
347 U.S. 521 (1954) (refusing to grant divestiture despite finding that defendant had unlawfully main-
tained its monopoly power that was also protected by naturally occurring barriers to entry). Indeed, in 
United Shoe, the court specifically found that United Shoe's monopoly was protected by goodwill and 
the availability of complements: 
To combat United's market control, a competitor must be prepared with knowledge 
of shoemaking, engineering skill, capacity to invent around patents, and financial 
resources sufficient to bear the expense of long developmental and experimental 
processes. The competitor must be prepared for consumers' resistance founded on 
their long-term, satisfactory relations with United, and on the cost to them of sur-
rendering United's leases. Also, the competitor must be prepared to give, or point 
to the source of. repair and other services, and to the sources of supplies for ma-
chine parts, expendable parts, and the like. 
/d. at 344 (emphases added). Despite the presence of these naturally occurring "barriers to entry," in-
cluding increasing returns in consumption of United Shoe's machines, the court refused to order dives-
titure, and the Supreme Court affirmed. United Shoe, 347 U.S. at 521. 
To be sure, the Supreme Court all but ordered divestiture over a decade later. See United States 
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 252 (1968) (reversing and remanding trial court's denial of 
government petition for divestiture). See also Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Support Of Proposed Final 
Judgment at 32, Microsoft (No. 98-1232) (invoking this decision as an instance involving disintegration 
of an otherwise unitary enterprise). This decision, however, rested on the Court's conclusion that the 
behavioral relief initially ordered by the district court had not, in fact, entirely undone the effect of the 
defendant's anticompetitive practices. United Shoe, 391 U.S. at 251-52. But cf United States v. United 
Shoe Mach. Corp., 266 F. Supp. 328, 332 (D. Mass. 1967) (finding that there were 126 suppliers of new 
shoe machines and that "United is subject to constant full and free competition from competitors' ma-
chines"). See also John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, A (Cautionary) Note on Remedies in the Micro-
soft Case, 13 ANTITRUST 25, 28 (1998). At most, then, the Supreme Court's decision in United Shoe 
stands for the proposition that, in a decade or so, the district court should revisit the effects of any be-
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On the other hand, an assertion that Microsoft maintained the applica-
tions barrier would seem uncontroversial, at least in a legal sense. After all, 
the government prevailed at trial on its claims that Microsoft unlawfully 
"bundled" IE with the Windows operating system, "forcing" OEMs to in-
stall IE even though some might have preferred Netscape.99 The govern-
ment also prevailed on its claim that Microsoft "maintained" its operating 
system monopoly by bundling, negotiating exclusive or primary dealing 
contracts, and taking steps to forestall Java's entry into the marketplace. Ioo 
Finally, the government prevailed on its claim that Microsoft attempted to 
monopolize the browser market. 101 These various tactics, the government 
alleged, prevented Netscape from evolving into middleware, a development 
that would have lowered the applications barrier, necessitating the remedy 
that the government seeks. It would seem to follow, then, that Microsoft's 
acts did, in fact, maintain the applications barrier. 
While the government prevailed on these three claims, it did so with-
out demonstrating that Microsoft did in fact maintain the applications bar-
rier. More precisely, the first two claims depended upon outmoded legal 
doctrine, descended from the inhospitality tradition, doctrine that dispensed 
with any requirement that the government actually prove anticompetitive 
effects. The third claim, attempted monopolization, ·while resting on a 
sounder doctrinal foundation, required no proof that the applications barrier 
to entry existed, let alone that Microsoft's anticompetitive conduct main-
tained it. 
1. Tying 
Consider first the claim that Microsoft unlawfully "tied" or "bundled" 
IE to Windows 95, and then to Windows 98. According to the government, 
such bundling took several forms, including: 1) the requirement that OEMs 
purchase and install IE along with Windows; 2) contractual provisions pre-
venting OEMs from removing the IE "icon" from the PC desktop before 
shipment to consumers; and 3) contractual provisions preventing OEMs 
from disabling IE. 102 To prevail on this claim, the government did not have 
to show that the bundle was anticompetitive. Instead, the government in-
voked, and the district court applied, the per se rule against tying reaffirmed 
in Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde. 103 To prevail under a per 
havioral relief it might order. It does not, as the government seems to suggest, support disintegration 
instanter. 
99 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 47-51. 
IOO /d. at 37-44. 
10 I /d. at 45-46. 
102 /d. at 47; Plaintiffs' Joint Response to Microsoft's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply 
in Support of Motions for Preliminary lnjuction at 53-54, Microsoft (No. 98-1232). 
103 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 47; Plaintiffs' Joint Response To Microsoft's Motion For Sum-
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se analysis, the government merely had to show that: 1) Microsoft pos-
sessed market power; 2) Windows and IE were separate products for anti-
trust purposes; 3) Microsoft "conditioned" the licensing of Windows to 
OEMs on their agreement also to purchase IE; and 4) the arrangement in-
volved a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce. 104 Under Jeffer-
son Parish, satisfaction of this test doomed the challenged arrangement, 
regardless of its actual benefits and costs. 105 
Given the district court's factual fmdings, the tying claim was a cake-
walk for the government. Microsoft had a ninety percent share of the rele-
vant market for Intel-based PC operating systems. Moreover, there was a 
"separate demand" for operating systems and browsers, with the result that 
the two were properly deemed separate products under the test articulated 
mary Judgment And Reply In Support Of Motions For Preliminary Injunction at 48 (arguing that "Mi-
crosoft's Forced Licensing Oflntemet Explorer to OEMs" is unlawful per se); Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed 
Conclusions of Law at 53-61, Microsoft (No. 98-1232) (same). See also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. 
No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-29 {1985). 
104 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12-18. See also Eastman Kodak, Inc. v. Image Technical Servs., 
504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992). 
105 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 34-35 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (criticizing the per se rule as 
overinclusive because it condemns certain contracts without any inquiry into their actual harms and 
benefits.). To be sure, some lower courts have recognized certain affirmative defenses to tying contracts 
that are otherwise unlawful per se. See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz ofN. Am., 833 F.2d 1342, 
1348-49 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the recognition of such a defense would seem inconsistent with the 
best reading of Supreme Court precedent. Meese, Forcing, supra note 27, at 21 n.74. At any rate, the 
United States assumed that such a defense was not available, and the district court apparently agreed. 
Plaintiffs' Joint Conclusions of Law at 54, Microsoft (No. 98-1232) ("The requirements for application 
of the per se rule are met in this case by Microsoft's several means of forcing licensees-whether per-
sonal computer manufacturers or end users-to take (and often actually use) a browser along with the 
operating system .... That is enough for liability. In addition, it is clear that, even under a Rule of Rea-
son analysis, there is no business justification for Microsoft's tying practices and that those practices 
have threatened anticompetitive effects in the browser market and maintained Microsoft's monopoly in 
the operating system market.") (emphasis added); Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 47 (stating that "liability 
for tying exists" when four Jefferson Parish factors are present); id. at 47-51 (finding a tying violation 
without mentioning possibility of a business justification); cf id. at 40 (considering possible business 
justifications as part of analysis of monopoly maintenance claim). 
To be sure, the separate products inquiry does serve to "filter out" and save from condemnation 
some procompetitive bundles. Ford's bundle of a transmission and engine, for instance, would not be 
deemed unlawful per se, even if the firm were a monopolist. Indeed, at one time, lower courts at least 
employed the single product portion of the inquiry as a sort of"mini-rule of reason." See, e.g., Principe 
v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303,307-11 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding that franchise trademark and lease 
of franchise premises were a single product because "the challenged aggregation is an essential ingredi-
ent for the franchise system's formula for success."); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 366 (1994) ("[before Jefferson Parish] creative 
courts have manipulated the judicial test so as to distinguish efficient from inefficient forced sales."). 
Jefferson Parish, however, rejected this approach, in favor of the so-called "separate demand" standard. 
As I have argued elsewhere, the "separate demand" test is underinclusive in that it only recognizes those 
efficiencies that are universally realized by all market participants. See Meese, Monopoly Bundling in 
Cyberspace, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 65, 86-89 (1999) [hereinafter Meese, Monopoly Bundling]. Thus, in 
those instances in which only some market participants find bundling an efficient practice, the per se 
rule will condemn the arrangement whenever the seller has market power, without allowing the seller an 
opportunity to justify the practice. /d. at 86-88. 
2001] DON'T DISINTEGRATE MICROSOIT 783 
in Jefferson Parish. 106 Finally, Microsoft plainly "conditioned" the sale of 
Windows upon an agreement by OEMs to accept IE. 107 
Still, proof that the Windows!IE bundle was unlawful per se did not 
establish that the bundle in fact harmed consumers, let alone that the prac-
tice maintained the applications "barrier to entry." Satisfaction of the per se 
test does not identify ties that are anticompetitive in any meaningful sense. 
Instead, the per se rule purportedly identifies those instances in which a 
seller with market power "forces" a purchaser to buy a tied product that it 
otherwise would not have wanted, thus thwarting "competition on the mer-
its."108 Such forcing, of course, does not harm competition or consumer 
welfare in any meaningful sense, but is instead analogous to contractual 
unconscionability. 109 Moreover, even if one assumes that "forcing" should 
itself establish antitrust liability, proof of the elements necessary to estab-
lish a per se violation does not establish its existence. Tying contracts-
even those entered by monopolists--can serve beneficial purposes, and 
beneficial contracts are presumptively examples of voluntary integration, 
and thus not "forced" on purchasers. 110 Still, the per se rule does not allow 
106 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462-63; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21-22 (articulating and 
applying separate demand test). More precisely, the government established that some manufacturers of 
operating systems allowed OEMs to choose which browser to purchase and install on their PCs. Micro-
soft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 49; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, '1!153 (D.D.C. 1999) ("A 
number of operating system vendors offer consumers the choice of licensing their operating systems 
without a browser. Others bundle a browser with their operating system products but allow OEMs, 
value added resellers, and consumers either to not install it or, if the browser has been pre-installed, to 
uninstall it."). Under the Jefferson Parish test, the fact that some sellers allowed purchasers to select 
their own browsers established a "separate demand" for this "product." Meese, Monopoly Bundling, 
supra note 105, at 96-97. 
Of course, Microsoft argued that the "separate demand" test for identifying separate products 
should not apply to alleged ties that involve the innovative integration of previously separate functions 
into a single software program. Defendant Microsoft Corporation's Proposed Conclusions of Law 2-13, 
Microsoft (No. 98-1232). See also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(finding that combination of previously separate functionalities that created plausible benefits was an 
"integrated product" and thus beyond scope of 1994 consent decree). I have argued elsewhere that there 
is no justification for treating software innovations any differently from other innovations under the 
Sherman Act. See Meese, Monopoly Bundling, supra note 105, at 105-107. 
107 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 50. 
108 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464 n.9 ("The essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrange-
ment lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the 
purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase 
elsewhere on different terms. When such 'forcing' is present, competition on the merits in the market 
for the tied item is restrained and the Sherman Act is violated.") (quoting Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 
12); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14-15 (holding that market power inquiry is designed to identify 
instances of forcing); Meese, Forcing, supra note 27, at 20-21 (showing that tying law depends upon 
the normative assumption that mere forcing constitutes anticompetitive harm); 
109 Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: the Consumer Protection 
Issues, 62 B.U. L. REv. 661, 667 (1982) (noting that injury from tying contracts as assumed by current 
doctrine is akin to a tort against "coerced" purchasers). This is not to say that all tying contracts are 
"unconscionable" and thus unenforceable under the general Jaw of contracts. Mere procedural uncon-
scionability does not suffice to void a contract; a party seeking to avoid such an agreement must show 
substantive unconscionability as well. Were it otherwise, monopolists could never enforce contracts. 
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not "forced" on purchasers. 110 Still, the per se rule does not allow monopo-
lists to justify ties on such grounds and rests upon a false presumption that 
all ties obtained by monopolists are the result of forcing. 111 Indeed, the dis-
trict court recognized that the per se rule embraced by the government, in-
cluding the "separate demand" test for identifying separate products, is 
vastly overinclusive, particularly when applied to industries characterized 
by rapid innovation. 112 Nevertheless, the district court refused the advice of 
its own amicus curiae to craft an alternative standard that would have re-
quired the plaintiff actually to prove significant anticompetitive risk in or-
der to establish the existence of "separate products," and thus liability on 
the tying claim. 113 Thus, even if one were to take the economic premises of 
the per se rule as a given, the government's victory on the tying claim es-
tablished only that Microsoft had "forced" OEMs to purchase IE. This vic-
tory in no way established, or even suggested, that Microsoft had, in fact, 
"maintained" the applications barrier to entry. 114 
110 Meese, Forcing, supra note 27, at 59-91. 
Ill See supra note 105; Meese, Forcing, supra note 27, at 86-94 (arguing that the Supreme Court 
should abandon the per se rule for this reason). Cf Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 466-67 (arguing that 
antitrust presumptions should rest on market realities and not formalistic distinctions). 
112 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 51 ("A court mechanically applying a strict "separate demand" 
test [for determining whether two products are present] could improvidently wind up condemning 
"integrations" that represent genuine improvements to software that are benign from the standpoint of 
consumer welfare and a competitive market. ... To the extent that the Supreme Court has spoken 
authoritatively on these issues, however, this Court is bound to follow its guidance and is not at liberty 
to extrapolate a new rule governing the tying of software products."); id. at 51 n.6 (appearing to endorse 
the suggestion by amicus curiae Lawrence Lessig that the per se rule be limited to instances where seller 
bundles partial substitutes as a means of "sabatog[ing] a nascent technology that might compete with 
the tying product but for its foreclosure from the market.") (quoting 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 495 (Supp. 1999)). It should be noted that the test proposed by Profes-
sor Lessig apparently did not require proof that Microsoft in fact maintained the applications barrier as a 
condition for liability under the tying count. See infra note 113 (describing approach suggested by 
Professor Lessig). Nevertheless, the Lessig test was a substantial improvement over current law, as it 
would have substantially narrowed the class of ties deemed presumptively unlawful. 
113 In particular, Professor Lessig argued that Windows 98 and Internet Explorer were separate 
products under the Jefferson Parish separate demand standard but that the court should also craft an 
alternative standard in light of modern antitrust thinking and the peculiarities of software technology. 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Lawrence Lessig at 22-26, Microsoft (No. 98-1232); id. at 43 n.35 (noting that 
proposed standard could be characterized as a Rule of Reason or per se test). Under Professor Lessig's 
proposed approach, two software functionalities bundled in a new way, whether by contract or technol-
ogy, would be deemed a single product and thus beyond tying scrutiny unless the plaintiff could show 
that such bundling would likely have an anticompetitive impact. See id. at 38-43. Professor Lessig also 
suggested that, in fact, the government had made such a showing, because Netscape was a partial sub-
stitute for Windows. See id. at 41. Professor Lessig also apparently assumed that Netscape would have 
remained on the vast majority of desktops and evolved into middleware absent Microsoft's unlawful 
tactics, although this assumption was not necessary to a determination of liability under the test he 
proposed. Although it may be possible that the evidence presented at trial could have supported such a 
conclusion, it must be emphasized that the district court did not actually make this finding. See infra 
note 114. 
114 It should be noted that the government also argued that the bundle did not pass muster under 
the Rule of Reason. See Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Conclusions of Law at 61-62, Microsoft (No. 98-
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The per se rule was particularly overinclusive in this case. As sug-
gested above, the government sought and the district court granted applica-
tion of the rule to the initial bundling as well as the licensing provisions 
that prevented OEMs from "unbundling."115 These latter provisions, how-
ever, cannot be plausibly characterized as tying agreements; they operated 
only after title had passed to those who were "forced" to purchase the tied 
product. 116 They were, therefore, post-sale vertical restraints, and thus 
properly analyzed under the Rule of Reason. I 17 Such an analysis would 
have revealed important information about the effect of these post-sale re-
straints, information that could have supported (or undermined) the gov-
ernment's assertion that Microsoft "maintained" the applications barrier to 
entry.11s 
1232). However, the district court did not address this argument. Instead, the court simply stated that 
proof of the four elements of the per se test was also "required" for a Rule of Reason claim. But cf Alan 
J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 
MICH. L. REv. Ill, 145-46 ( 1996) (showing that power in the tying product market is not necessary to a 
showing that tying contract works competitive harm). The court did not indicate what sort of proof 
would be sufficient to establish such a claim. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 51-54 (evaluating and reject-
ing government's claim that exclusive and primary dealing contracts were unreasonable). 
115 See infra note 118; see also Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Conclusions of Law at 54, Microsoft 
(No. 98-1232) (contending that "the requirement that OEMs include [Internet Explorer] along with 
Windows [and] the refusal to allow use of an add/remove or uninstall option by OEMs" were "means of 
forcing licensees ... to take (and often actually to use) a browser along with the operating system."). 
116 The district court did not explain why it treated these contractual restraints as tying agreements. 
The United States suggested that the agreements were tying contracts because they forced ultimate 
consumers-not OEMS-to purchase Internet Explorer. See Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Conclusions of 
Law at 54, Microsoft (No. 98-1232). However, the contracts in question did not purport to bind con-
sumers to do or not do anything, but instead operated only against the OEMs. These post-sale restric-
tions do not themselves "force" third parties to do anything. Deletion of the software code that provides 
browser functionality apparently destroys operating system functionality, and no OEM has expressed a 
desire to remove that functionality and thus destroy the very system for which there are purportedly no 
substitutes. See Meese, Monopoly Bundling, supra note 105, at 115. While OEMs may wish to hide the 
IE icon or disable browser functionality, these less drastic steps do not in any way remove or delete 
from a PC the software code that provides browser functionality. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 
F.3d. 935, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Instead, such actions leave this code fully intact with the result that 
ultimate purchasers are free to summon browser functionality by typing a line of software code. !d. 
Thus, any consumer who purchases a PC that includes Windows necessarily "purchases" the browser 
functionality known as Internet Explorer, regardless whether licensing agreements prevent OEMs from 
hiding the icon or disabling browser functionality. These contractual restraints, then, do not themselves 
"force" consumers to do anything. Instead the "forcing," if it exists, is a result of Microsoft's techno-
logical integration of browser and operating system functionality. 
117 Meese, Monopoly Bundling, supra note 105, at 115 (explaining that post-sale contractual 
restrictions on OEMs are properly "subject to rule of reason scrutiny as non-price vertical restraints"). 
118 For instance, analysis of such restraints under the Rule of Reason would have required the 
government to demonstrate-{)r attempt to demonstrate-that, but for these restraints, a significant 
number of OEMs would have disabled Internet Explorer and/or removed the Internet Explorer icon and 
that these steps would have significantly enhanced Netscape's market position. Such proof, of course, 
would have gone a long way toward establishing that the combination of bundling and post-contractual 
restraints actually maintained the applications barrier to entry. 
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2. Monopolization 
But what about the monopolization count? Surely the government had 
to establish that Microsoft actually maintained the applications barrier to 
prove its claim of monopoly maintenance. Apparently not. Instead, under 
the standards sought by the government and applied by the district court, 
the government merely had to prove that Microsoft engaged in "exclusion-
ary conduct" instead of "competition on the merits" and that that conduct 
impaired Sun's Java strategy and deprived Netscape of access to a signifi-
cant number of consumers. 119 There was no requirement that the govern-
ment show that such conduct would drive Netscape from the marketplace, 
prevent the emergence of a viable Java language, or otherwise raise the 
applications barrier to entry. To the contrary, proof that Microsoft's con-
duct significantly impaired Netscape's and Sun's business opportunities by 
itself cast upon Microsoft a burden of justification. 120 Moreover, Microsoft 
could not meet this burden by merely showing that its conduct produced 
substantial benefits that outweighed any competitive harm. The government 
also had to show that these benefits did not explain the "full extent" of Mi-
crosoft's conduct. 121 Failure to meet this burden established liability on this 
count.122 
The monopolization standards sought and obtained by the government 
quite plainly reflected the influence of the inhospitality tradition. Indeed, 
the very distinction between "competition on the merits" and "exclusionary 
conduct" the government invoked reflects a bias against contractual devices 
that reach beyond the boundaries of the firm-devices economists gener-
ally presume to be procompetitive. 123 Competition "on the merits," after all, 
119 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 37-38; accord Eastman Kodak, Inc. v. Image Technical Servs., 
504 U.S. 451, 483-85 (1992); Plaintiffs Joint Proposed Conclusions of Law at 15, Microsoft (No. 98-
1232) ("The [Supreme] Court has used the language of 'exclusionary' or 'anticompetitive' or 'preda-
tory' to label the unlawful conduct and to distinguish it from competition on the merits reflected in 
Grinnell's reference to 'superior product, business acumen, or historic accident."') (citations omitted). 
120 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 38 ("If the evidence reveals a significant exclusionary impact in 
the relevant market, the defendant's conduct will be labeled 'anticompetitive'-and liability will at-
tach-unless the defendant comes forward with specific, procompetitive business motivations that 
explain the full extent of its exclusionary conduct."). The United States suggested a standard even less 
forgiving to defendants. Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Conclusions of Law at 16, Microsoft (No. 98-1232) 
(arguing that conduct that "tends to impair rivals' opportunities" must be justified) (emphasis added). 
121 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (stating that the specific business motivations offered by the 
defendant must "explain the full extent of its exclusionary conduct.") (emphasis added) (citing Eastman 
Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483.). 
122 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 38; accord Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483. 
123 Cf Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1985) (holding that ties ob-
tained by firms with market power involve unjustified contractual interference with "competition on the 
merits"); Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Co., 394 U.S. 495, 508 (1969) (holding that tying con-
tracts obtained by firms with market power necessarily curtail "competition on the merits"); Brown 
Shoe Co. v. United States, 384 U.S. 316, 321-22 (1966) (concluding that exclusive dealing contracts 
offended "central policy" of the Sherman Act "against contracts which take away freedom of purchasers 
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is limited to unilateral activities such as the creation of a superior product, 
greater productive efficiencies, and the like. 124 By contrast, just about any 
vertical arrangement entered by a monopolist will "impair the opportunities 
of rivals," and thus cast upon the defendant a burden of justification.125 
Tying, for instance, is not "competition on the merits," but instead pre-
sumptively unlawful if accomplished by a monopolist. 126 So are exclusive 
dealing or supply contracts. 127 Neither of these presumptions, of course, is 
justified by modem economic theory. 128 
Current law does allow for the rebuttal of this presumption. Still, this 
opportunity is sometimes more illusory than real, particularly in light of the 
requirement imposed by some courts that the legitimate objective or objec-
tives explain the "full extent" of the conduct under scrutiny .129 This re-
quirement is, of course, simply an application of the "less restrictive alter-
native" test commonly employed in litigation under the Rule of Reason. 130 
to buy in an open market"). See also WILLIAMSON, supra note 20, at 28 (concluding that there is a 
"rebuttable presumption that non-standard forms of contracting have efficiency purposes."). 
124 See Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Conclusions of Law at 15, Microsoft (No. 98-1232) (equating 
competition on the merits with a "superior product, business acumen, or historic accident") (quoting 
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)). See also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen 
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 604 (1985) (distinguishing "between practices which tend to 
exclude or restrict competition on the one hand, and the success of a business which reflects only a 
superior product, a well-run business, or luck, on the other."). Of course, even unilateral acts can con-
stitute exclusionary conduct for purposes of section 2; predatory pricing is the most prominent example. 
See generally Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 605 n.32 (conduct is unlawfully exclusionary if it furthers 
"competition on the merits ... in an unnecessarily restrictive way."). Nevertheless, the standards gov-
erning such unilateral action are far more lenient than those governing contractual arrangements. Com-
pare Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986) (requiring 
significant evidence to sustain predatory pricing claim in the face of summary judgment attack) with 
Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483-85 (holding tying contracts presumptively exclusionary for summary 
judgment purposes). See also, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 
U.S. 209, 223 (1993) (treating above cost prices as "competition on the merits" or otherwise beyond 
judicial cognizance); Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1360 (8th Cir. 1989) (granting "strong pre-
sumption" of legality for prices above variable cost even if they entirely exclude rivals from the mar-
ket). This deferential treatment of conduct like pricing that occurs "within" the firm and contracts that 
extend beyond the firm is a product of the inhospitality tradition. See, e.g., Meese, Forcing, supra note 
27, at 8-9,50-51 (asserting that the traditional approach to tying contracts rests upon unjustified hostil-
ity toward attempts to reach beyond the boundaries of the firm by contract). 
125 Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Conclusions of Law at 16, Microsoft (No. 98-1232). 
126 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483-85; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12. 
127 Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 578. 
128 See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text (describing developments in economic theory 
that have undermined the economic assumptions that formed the basis of the inhospitality tradition). 
129 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 38; Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483. But see Ronald A. Cass & 
Keith Hylton, Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft, 8 GEO. 
MASON L. REv. I, 27-28 (1999) (contending that imposition of less restrictive alternative test is not 
consistent with the best view of current monopolization law). 
130 See, e.g., Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 
1993) (dicta). Indeed, Eastman Kodak, upon which the district court relied, itself relied upon tying cases 
brought under section 3 of the Clayton Act. 504 U.S. at 484 (citing lnt'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 
U.S. 392,397-98 (1947); IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936)). 
788 GEO. MASON L. REv. [VOL. 9:3 
Under such an approach, restraints that are on balance beneficial will nev-
ertheless be condemned if less anticompetitive means could produce the 
same benefits. 131 Strangely, this requirement can penalize restraints not for 
reducing competition, but for failing to increase it enough. 132 Moreover, the 
influence of the inhospitality tradition has often led courts and the govern-
ment to declare certain less effective alternatives to be less restrictive alter-
natives, the purported existence of which justifies condemnation of the re-
straint under scrutiny. 133 
Of course, in some cases, defendants will be able to justify presump-
tively unlawful arrangements, even under the sort of strict scrutiny required 
by current law. Indeed, a court could mitigate somewhat the harsh results 
produced by the preference for "competition on the merits" by allowing 
defendants a meaningful opportunity to explain their conduct, or by dis-
pensing with the less restrictive alternative test. 134 Still, the existence of 
such a "safety valve" for efficient practices will not ensure that all such 
practices escape condemnation. Some efficient practices just cannot be ex-
plained, and plausible explanations sometimes fall on "deaf ears."135 Fur-
131 Capital Imaging, 996 F.2d at 543; 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 112, at 385-89. It 
should be noted that judges have not universally embraced the less restrictive alternative test. See, e.g., 
American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1249 (3d Cir. 1975); NFL v. N. Am. 
Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074, 1079 (1982) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) ("The antitrust laws impose a 
standard of reasonableness, not a standard of absolute necessity."). Cf Cont'I T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylva-
nia, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (finding that location restriction should be subject to the Rule of Rea-
son even though it was "neither the least nor the most restrictive provision that [Sylvania] could have 
used.") 
132 An example from the merger context will suffice to prove this counter-intuitive assertion. 
Under the Merger Guidelines, efficiencies will justify an otherwise unlawful merger if: the efficiencies 
"likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger's potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, 
e.g., by preventing price increases in that market" and the efficiencies are specific to the merger in 
question, i.e., cannot be achieved by means of a less restrictive alternative. See Revision to the Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines Issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 
§ 4 (Apr. 8, 1997), 1997 FTC LEXIS 283. Thus, the enforcement agencies will reject mergers that will 
on balance benefit consumers if an alternative and hypothetical arrangement would benefit consumers 
even more. 
133 Meese, Price Theory, supra note 27, at 189-95 (demonstrating that various purported less 
restrictive alternatives to vertical distribution restraints are Jess effective); see also Meese, Forcing, 
supra note 27, at 71-86 (demonstrating that purportedly Jess restrictive alternatives to tying contracts are 
generally less effective as well). 
134 See Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 188-91 (2d Cir. 1992) (Mar-
shall, J.); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 303 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the 
presence of a Jess restrictive alternative does not ipso facto require condemnation of a purportedly 
monopolistic practice). See also Cass & Hylton, supra note 129, at 30-36 (arguing that courts should 
penalize conduct by a monopolist only where there is no plausible business justification for it). 
135 Meese, supra note 28, at 485-86. For instance, in United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 
U.S. 596 (1972), the defendants argued that territorial restraints ancillary to the creation of a legitimate 
purchasing cooperative were reasonably necessary to ensure effective promotion of the private label 
products created by the venture. Brief For Topco Associates, Inc. at 22-23, Topco Assocs. (No. 70-82). 
The district court found that the venturers lacked market power and that, in fact, the restraints accom-
plished this purpose and were therefore procompetitive. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 319 F. 
Supp. I 031, I 033 (N.D. Ill. 1970). Nevertheless, the United States persisted in its attack on the re-
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ther, the failure to justify a practice, even to a relatively hospitable court, 
does not establish that the practice in question is "anticompetitive" in any 
economically meaningful sense. A practice that is not procompetitive may 
simply be benign. At any rate, a firm may fully intend to harm competition 
by adopting overbroad restraints without any realistic chance of accom-
plishing its objective. 136 
Proof that Microsoft's practices were "exclusionary" and did not con-
stitute "competition on the merits" under the standards sought by the 
government and applied by the district court did not establish that these 
practices maintained the applications barrier to entry. The government 
proved that various aspects of Microsoft's conduct interfered with Net-
scape's access to customers that it might otherwise have claimed. 137 
Moreover, Microsoft was not able to explain or justify to the court's satis-
faction the "full extent" of the exclusionary impact of these practices. 138 
Still, such proof does not by itself establish the magnitude or market-wide 
impact of such conduct. 139 Thus, the district court's conclusion that Micro-
straints, and the Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling. See Meese, supra note 28, at 469-71, 
484-86. 
Judge Easterbrook has aptly critiqued the attitude toward business justifications adopted by 
current law. 
The [Supreme] Court is not alone in thinking that the defendant should be asked to 
justify its conduct and pay the penalty if it fails. But why? This means that the 
plaintiff wins whenever the defendant does not know or cannot explain the true 
function of its conduct. In business the only thought may be to make as much 
money as possible, and entrepreneurs often flounder from one practice to another 
trying to find one that works. When they do, they may not know why it works, 
whether because of efficiency or exclusion. They know only that it works. If they 
know why it works, they may be unable to articulate the reason to their lawyers-
because they are not skilled in the legal and economic jargon in which such 
"business justifications" must be presented in court, or perhaps because their 
lawyers cannot understand (or translate for a jury) what they have been told .... It 
takes economists years, sometimes decades, to understand why certain business 
practices work, to determine whether they work because of increased efficiency or 
exclusion. To award victory to the plaintiff because the defendant has failed to 
justify the conduct properly is to turn ignorance, of which we have regrettably 
much, into prohibition. That is a hard transmutation to justify. 
Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972, 975 ( 1986). 
136 Indeed, the structure of the law of attempted monopolization depends upon the assumption that 
firms that intend to acquire or maintain monopoly power may sometimes fall far short of their objective. 
Hence, it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that a defendant specifically intends to monopolize or 
maintain a monopoly and engages in predatory conduct toward that end. The plaintiff must also show 
that there is dangerous probability that the defendant will succeed in its attempt to obtain or maintain 
such power. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 454-59 (1992); Lorain Journal Co. v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951) (claim for attempt to maintain existing monopoly requires 
proof of dangerous probability of success). The automatic condemnation of overbroad restraints adopted 
by a monopolist seems to rest on a contrary, and fallacious, assumption. 
137 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 39-43 (D.D.C. 2000). 
138 /d. at 38-40 (concluding that various tying contracts were "exclusionary" because justifications 
proffered by Microsoft did not "fully explain" these arrangements). 
139 Cf supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text (showing that standards applied by the district 
court merely required government to prove that challenged conduct excluded Netscape from a "signifi-
cant" portion of the market place). 
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soft unlawfully "maintained" its monopoly in no way supports a conclusion 
that the firm's unlawful conduct caused the demise ofNetscape's or Sun's 
middleware strategy. 140 
3. Attempted Monopolization 
Unlike the tying and monopolization counts, the attempted monopoli-
zation count did require meaningful proof of anticompetitive effect, more 
precisely, a dangerous probability that Microsoft would in fact acquire a 
monopoly of the browser market. 141 Moreover, there is a single paragraph 
in the district court's opinion concluding that the government did, in fact, 
satisfy this element, because Microsoft's share of the browser market rose 
to over fifty percent after it embarked on a series of acts deemed "exclu-
sionary" under the standards discussed above. 142 Still, neither this para-
graph, nor the factual findings on which it rests, conclude that Microsoft's 
"exclusionary" acts deprived Netscape of the market share necessary to 
support its nascent rniddleware strategy. 
The government's assertion that Microsoft maintained the applications 
barrier depended upon an assumption that, but for Microsoft's "anticom-
petitive" conduct, Netscape would have remained a monopoly or near mo-
nopoly indefinitely, (lawfully) warding off any and all challenges to its 
preeminence. 143 Proof that Netscape's market share fell after Microsoft's 
unlawful acts did not establish that all, or even most, of that decline was 
due to Microsoft's anticompetitive practices. Post hoc non ergo propter 
140 Some of the district court's factual findings do seem to suggest that Microsoft's anticompeti-
tive acts themselves significantly disadvantaged Sun's Java strategy. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 43-44. 
Cf supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (contending that drop in Nets cape's market share could be 
attributed to Microsoft's procompetitive tactics). Nonetheless, the district court's legal conclusion that 
Microsoft "monopolized" in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act does not rest on such findings. At 
any rate, proof that Microsoft's anticompetitive tactics deprived Java of the opportunity to be successful 
does not ipso facto establish that Java would have been successful absent such tactics. See supra notes 
87-88 and accompanying text (discussing district court's conclusion that there is insufficient evidence to 
support a finding that Sun or Netscape would have been successful in their middleware strategies absent 
Microsoft's anticompetitive acts). Moreover, even if Java could have been successful, elimination of it 
as a competitive threat could only have a lasting, prospective competitive effect if Java were the only 
prospective middleware that could lower the applications barrier to entry. See supra notes 71-76 and 
accompanying text; supra notes 162-72 and accompanying text. 
141 Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 454-59; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 390 (1905); 
Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 45. 
142 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 46, (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, '11'11 
372-73 (D.D.C. 1999)). 
143 See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text (describing government's assertion that Net-
scape's status as potential middleware depended upon possession of dominant market share). Moreover, 
the district court itself found that Netscape could only have evolved into middleware if it had remained 
the "standard" internet browser. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 'I] 378 ("[T]he API's that Navigator ex-
poses could only attract enough developer attention to threaten the applications barrier to entry if Navi-
gator became-<>r appeared destined to become-the standard software used to browse the web."). 
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hoc. It seems equally possible that Netscape's market share would have 
fallen significantly, though perhaps not as much, if Microsoft had stuck to 
lawful means of competition, such as giving its browser away, continually 
enhancing its quality, and entering less onerous primary dealing 
contracts. I44 Such procompetitive conduct may not have driven Microsoft's 
browser share to near-monopoly levels. It may, however, have reduced 
Netscape's share to the point that it would no longer have been "the" web 
browser of choice, and thus a viable candidate for evolution into middle-
ware. 145 Indeed, the district court never defined what share of the browser 
market Netscape had to retain in order to remain the "standard" internet 
browser, and thus a viable candidate for evolution into middleware of the 
sort that could have undermined the applications barrier to entry. The dis-
trict court did not, for instance, determine whether it would have been 
enough for Netscape to retain a plurality or bare majority share of the mar-
ket. 146 Without such a fmding, it is simply not possible to assert with any 
degree of confidence that Microsoft's exclusionary conduct by itself de-
prived Netscape of its potential to evolve into rniddleware, or deprived Sun 
144 The government argued at one point that Microsoft's practice of giving its browser away for 
free was exclusionary. See Plaintiffs' Joint Response To Microsoft's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Reply in Support of Motions for Preliminary Injunction at 7-8, Microsoft (No. 98- I 232). The dis-
trict court rejected this argument, and expressly found that the introduction of Internet Explorer, con-
tinuing improvements in its quality, as well as the practice of giving it away for free were procompeti-
tive. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at~ 408 ("The debut of Internet Explorer and its rapid improvement gave 
Netscape an incentive to improve Navigator's quality at a competitive rate. The inclusion of Internet 
Explorer with Windows at no separate charge increased general familiarity with the Internet and re-
duced the cost to the public of gaining access to it, at least in part because it compelled Netscape to stop 
charging for Navigator. These actions contributed to improving the quality of Web browsing software, 
lowering its cost, and increasing its availability, thereby benefiting consumers."). Cf Jack Walters & 
Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 710 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The option of vertical integration 
places pressure on the firm's suppliers and buyers, who know that if they charge too much for their 
services the firm may try to perform them itself. It thus increases competition in the market for those 
services."); United States v. Ford Motor Co., 405 U.S. 562, 567-69 (1972) (holding that the threat of 
backward integration by customer enhanced competition among various suppliers). 
145 Indeed, the district court found that, by late 1996, "the average user could not discern a signifi-
cant difference in quality and features between the latest versions of Internet Explorer and Navigator," 
Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at~ 375, and that such quality enhancements were a necessary condition for 
the improvements in IE's marketshare. /d. (noting additionally that IE 4.0 won "a significant number of 
head-to-head product reviews against Navigator"); id. at ~ 135 ("When Microsoft released Internet 
Explorer 3.0 in late 1996, reviewers praised its vastly improved quality, and some even rated it as fa-
vorably as they did Navigator. After the arrival of Internet Explorer 4.0 in late 1997, the number of 
reviewers who regarded it as the superior product was roughly equal to those who preferred Naviga-
tor."). 
146 It should be noted that, as the share of the market required for potential middleware status falls, 
the number of applications with such potential necessarily increases. So, for instance, a determination 
that an application with a thirty percent share of the market can evolve into middleware would expand 
greatly the number of potential middleware competitors and thus lessen the competitive impact of the 
AppCo's potential production of middleware. Had the district court made findings on this point, it 
presumably would have been bound by those findings when determining whether AppCo's entry into 
the middleware business could in fact have a procompetitive effect. See infra notes 162-71 and accom-
panying text. 
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of an adequate vehicle for distribution of the Java Class Libraries and the 
Java Virtual Machine. If so, it seems difficult to argue that Microsoft's an-
ticompetitive conduct prevented the application barrier from falling, since 
the barrier would exist even if Microsoft had played the competitive game 
according to the Marquis of Queensberry rules. 147 
B. Would Netscape or Java have Evolved into Middleware? 
Even if the district court had found that Microsoft's exclusionary acts 
deprived Netscape of its status as the browser of choice or prevented Sun 
from successfully pursuing its Java strategy, the court nonetheless should 
have rejected the claim that Microsoft maintained the applications barrier. 
Simply put, the government never proved that Netscape or Java would have 
evolved into rniddleware of the sort that could have undermined the appli-
cations barrier to entry. After all, the gravamen of the attempted monopoli-
zation count was not that Microsoft attempted to maintain its monopoly 
power in the operating system market by maintaining the applications bar-
rier, although the government could have characterized its claim in this 
way. 148 Such a claim would have required the government actually to prove 
that Netscape or Java was a middleware threat, and that Microsoft's exclu-
sionary conduct eliminated the threat, either directly, by eliminating Net-
scape "as middleware," or indirectly, by eliminating Netscape as a viable 
vehicle for distributing the Java Class Libraries or the Java Virtual Ma-
chine. 149 Instead, the government claimed that Microsoft engaged in exclu-
sionary tactics specifically designed to monopolize the browser market, and 
that there was a dangerous probability of achieving that end. 150 The district 
147 The district court did conclude that "Internet Explorer's quality and features have never sur-
passed Navigator's to such a degree as to compel a significant part of Navigator's installed base to 
switch to Internet Explorer." Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at~ 375 (emphasis added). The court also con-
cluded that "if Microsoft had taken no action other than improving the quality and features of its 
browser, Internet Explorer's share of usage would have risen far less and far more slowly than it actu-
ally did." /d. One could conclude from these findings that Netscape would have retained its dominant 
position, but for Microsoft's anticompetitive tactics. Such a conclusion would not be warranted, how-
ever, for two reasons. First, undermining Navigator's installed base was not the only method of reduc-
ing its market share. Second, these findings do not consider the effect of Microsoft's policy of giving its 
browser away for free, a policy which the district court found to be procompetitive. After considering 
the effect of this policy, the district court was only able to conclude that, on their own, the combination 
of higher quality and lower price "would not have weaned such a large amount of usage share from 
Navigator, much less overtaken Navigator in three years." /d. at~ 376. This latter finding falls signifi-
cantly short of a conclusion that, but for Microsoft's anticompetitive conduct, Navigator would have 
retained its status as the "dominant browser of choice" indefinitely. 
148 Cf Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 150-55 (1951) (sustaining finding that 
monopolist had "attempted to monopolize" by "us[ing] its monopoly to destroy threatened competi-
tion"). 
149 /d. at 153-54 (finding attempt to monopolize where defendant had launched predatory attack 
against firm that had already entered defendant's market). 
150 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 46. See also supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. 
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court expressly found that there was insufficient evidence in the record to 
support a finding that Netscape or Java would have evolved into the sort of 
middleware that could undermine the applications barrier absent Micro-
soft's campaign against them. I5I This finding would seem to undermine 
entirely the government's argument for disintegration. I 52 
The assertion that the government failed to prove that Microsoft actu-
ally maintained the applications barrier may appear startling at first. After 
all, the "applications barrier to entry" was central to the "story" animating 
the government's case. The existence of the barrier explained why Micro-
soft's monopoly was relatively impervious to new entry, and a desire to 
maintain that barrier explained why the firm reacted so vigorously to Net-
scape's potential entry into the middleware business. Still, while it told a 
compelling story, the government chose to rely upon outmoded rules of 
liability that did not require proof of certain key elements of the story. 
These elements, it turns out, are essential to the government's prayer for 
disintegration. By lightening its burden at the trial stage, the government 
undermined its case at the remedy stage. I 53 
The careful reader may think that this Article is simply trying to reliti-
gate the liability phase of the case, much as a capital defendant might try to 
cast doubt on his guilt during a sentencing hearing in an attempt to con-
vince the jury to choose a conduct remedy-life in prison without parole. I 54 
That is not my intent. I am convinced that Microsoft did offend the per se 
I 51 Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at~ 411 {"There is insufficient evidence to find that, absent Micro-
soft's actions, Navigator and Java already would have ignited genuine competition in the market for 
lntel-compatible PC operating systems."); id. at ~ 407 {"It is not clear whether, absent Microsoft's 
interference, Sun's Java efforts would by now have facilitated porting between Windows and other 
platforms enough to weaken the applications barrier to entry."); id. at ~ 29 {"It remains to be seen, 
though, whether there will ever be a sustained stream of full-featured applications written solely to 
middleware AP!s. In any event, it would take several years for middleware and the applications it sup-
ports to evolve from the status quo to a point at which the cost to the average consumer of choosing a 
non-Intel compatible PC operating system over an Intel-compatible one falls so low as to constrain the 
pricing of the latter systems."); id. at ~ 77 ("[M]iddleware technologies have a long way to go before 
they might imperil the applications barrier to entry. Windows 98 exposes nearly ten thousand AP!s, 
whereas the combined AP!s of Navigator and the Java Class Libraries, together representing the greatest 
hope for proponents of middleware, total less than a thousand."). 
152 One could argue that, by definition, Microsoft's own actions deprived the tribunal of the sort of 
evidence necessary to determine whether Netscape and/or Java would have developed into middleware 
absent Microsoft's anticompetitive acts. Thus, it could be said, Microsoft should not benefit from the 
absence of such information. Perhaps it is appropriate to adopt a presumption that Netscape and Java 
would have evolved into middleware but for Microsoft's anticompetitive acts. Even so, Microsoft 
should be afforded an opportunity to rebut such a presumption, an opportunity that Judge Jackson did 
not allow. 
153 Cf William E. Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies For Dominant Firm Misconduct, 31 
CONN. L. REV. 1285, 1311-12 (1999) (arguing persuasively that ''the elaboration of remedies should 
proceed side by side with formulation of a theory of liability and collection of evidence"). 
154 Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury And Absolution: The Intersection Of Trial Strategy, Re-
morse, And The Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1557, 1577-85 (1998) (marshalling empirical 
evidence that this strategy rarely works). 
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rule against tying contracts when it required OEMs to take IE. 155 I also 
think the firm "monopolized" the operating system market and "attempted 
to monopolize" the market for internet browsers under current law. Of 
course, I do not think the per se rule against tying is consistent with existing 
economic theory. 156 Moreover, I would not require monopolists to justify 
any and all tying or exclusive dealing contracts simply because these ar-
rangemnents depart from some obsolete notion of "competition on the 
merits." In the real world, where bargaining costs, information costs, and 
opportunism abound, contracts are as much a part of "competition" as 
price-cutting and quality improvement. 157 
Still, the precedents supporting the per se rule and the overinclusive 
rules defining monopolization are "on the books." Once the government 
decided to invoke these rules, the district court had no choice but to enforce 
them. 158 Moreover, even if the rules governing tying and monopolization 
better reflected sound economic theory, it seems possible that the govern-
ment could have prevailed. On the tying count, for instance, the govern-
ment proved that Microsoft was selling two products. It also proved that the 
practice of bundling Windows and IE significantly raised Netscape's cost 
of distribution, thus depriving ISVs (and Sun) of a particular input-Net-
scape on most desktops-that could have enhanced the demand for their 
products, thus increasing the number of compliments available for new 
155 As I have written elsewhere, I do not believe that current law warrants a different result simply 
because the Windows/IE bundle can plausibly be characterized as "innovation." See Meese, Monopoly 
Bundling, supra note I 05, at I 03-07. The whole point of the law of tying is to allow purchasers to 
choose which bundle of goods and services-which innovation-they wish to purchase. Absent a 
showing that such purchasing decisions are distorted by some market failure, there is no reason to allow 
a monopolist to override that choice./d. at 112-15. 
156 Meese, Forcing, supra note 27, at 61-96. 
157 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 62 (1911); Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 1-3. 
158 State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (holding that lower courts are not free to ignore Su-
preme Court precedents, even if such precedents are destined to be overruled). One could imagine the 
United States asserting that it had no choice but to invoke decisions such as Jefferson Parish which, 
after all, is still "good law." Unlike lower federal courts, however, the Executive Branch is a coordinate 
branch of government. The Attorney General and, ultimately, the President, have a duty to faithfully 
execute the law as they see it; they are not minions of the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court 
may abandon precedents whose premises have proved false, so too may the enforcement agencies refuse 
to pursue theories of liability that fly in the face of modem economic theory. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp 
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,732 (1988) ("The Sherman Act adopted the term 'restraint of trade' along 
with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common law itself and not merely the static content that the 
common law had assigned to the term in 1890."); Easterbrook, supra note 19, at 711-12 (describing 
instances in which the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission properly refused to follow 
precedents "on the books"); William Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion and the 
'Common Law' Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REv. 661 (1982). See also Meese, supra note 28, at 
487-88 n.ll 0. Hence, the United States was within its rights to refuse to pursue a "per se" theory of 
tying liability, for instance. At the very least, the government could have asked the court to make sepa-
rate findings under the rule of reason. See supra note 113 (noting that the court's own Amicus suggested 
that it make such findings). Cf Kovacic, supra note 153, at 1311-12. 
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operating systems. I 59 Further proof, namely, that Netscape was the only 
source of this input, could have sufficed to establish a prima facie case un-
der the Rule of Reason. I60 Still, the government chose not to pursue such a 
case, thus guaranteeing the absence of Findings necessary to show that Mi-
crosoft actually raised the applications barrier to entry. 
C. Will the AppCo Really Introduce Middleware Competition? 
This is not to say that proof that Microsoft in fact maintained the ap-
plications barrier to entry would in and of itself justify the firm's disinte-
gration. There is still the entirely separate question of whether dismember-
ing Microsoft will introduce middleware competition that would not other-
wise exist, and whether the prospect of that competition is sufficiently real 
to justify the destruction of presumptively beneficial integration. The dis-
trict court made no factual findings whatsoever touching on either of these 
questions. At the very least, it seems there should be a hearing to resolve 
both of them. Moreover, while predictions in this context are of dubious 
value, it would seem that the government would face an uphill battle on 
each question. 
Consider first the assertion that an independent AppCo might decide to 
convert the Microsoft Office Suite into middleware, thus creating an alter-
native platform to Windows. The government's line of argument boils 
down to a claim that Microsoft's failure to divest the Office Suite thwarts 
the actual potential competition that would take place but for Microsoft's-
intransigent insistence on retaining its own property. There is a strong anal-
ogy between this argument and the assertion that integration via a merger 
eliminates "actual potential competition," that is, the possibility that one of 
the merging firms will enter the market de novo. 161 The government has 
not, however, made the sort of showing courts have required in the merger 
context to undo voluntary integration based on that integration's supposed 
failure to increase competition. I62 In particular, the government has not and 
cannot show that the AppCo "plans" or "intends" to transform the Office 
159 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 53-54 (D. D.C. 2000). 
I60 Meese, Monopoly Bundling, supra note 105, at 109-10 n.150 (describing elements of a "raising 
rivals' costs" rule of reason case against Microsoft); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, 
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209, 225-
26 (1986) (concluding that a strategy designed to protect or obtain market power by depriving competi-
tors of distribution opportunities cannot be successful if alternative efficient channels of distribution are 
available). 
I61 Cf United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 537 (1973) (reserving question 
whether integration through merger that forestalls future increase in competition violates section 7 of 
the Clayton Act). 
I62 BOC Int'l v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24, 26-27 (2d Cir. 1977) (articulating elements of so-called "actual 
potential competition" doctrine). See also Falstaff Brewing, 410 U.S. at 560 (Marshall, J. concurring) 
(describing elements necessary to support such a claim). 
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Suite into middleware any time soon. 163 Nor has the government shown 
with any degree of certainty that such an attempt would be sufficiently suc-
cessful to justify the significant sunk investment that such entry would re-
quire. 164 Indeed, a free-standing Appco would be far behind Netscape, at 
least in a technological sense, because, as the government emphasizes, Mi-
crosoft has not to this date pursued a middleware strategy with respect to its 
Office Suite.165 
Even if the government could show that an independent AppCo would 
transform its Office Suite into middleware, such proof would not establish 
that this transformation would materially enhance competition. Instead, 
such proof would simply beg the question whether AppCo was the only 
potential entrant into the middleware business. There are, as the govern-
ment repeatedly reminded the district court, 70,000 applications; presuma-
bly Netscape is not the only one capable of exposing APis and thus capable 
of running other applications "cross platform."166 Removing two potential 
authors of middleware--even the most promising authors-from the mar-
ketplace does not by itself render the applications barrier insurmountable; 
some other application or applications might take Netscape's place. No-
where did the government show that Netscape and Java were the only po-
tential middleware, or that removal of these two participants from the mar-
ketplace would permanently deprive consumers of middleware. 
If there were other potential authors of middleware, then removal of 
one-AppCo---<:ould not be said to reduce rniddleware competition and 
maintain the application barrier to entry. 167 Indeed, proof that one other 
firm would develop successful middleware would itself suffice to render 
AppCo's refusal to develop middleware competitively insignificant. For, 
l63 Cf Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 353-55 (2d Cir. 1982) (reversing FTC finding that 
acquiring finn would have otherwise entered new market de novo because such a ruling rested on un-
warranted "speculation"); BOC lnt'l, 557 F.2d at 28-30 (holding proof that acquiring finn would have 
entered eventually not sufficient to establish that integration thwarts "actual potential competition"). 
164 Tenneco, 689 F.2d at 354-55 (rejecting findings that firm would have entered the market where 
such entry apparently would have been unprofitable); Dep't of Justice & FTC Joint Merger Guidelines§ 
3.2 (entry is not likely if it would not be profitable at premerger prices, given sunk costs). 
165 It is not clear from the parties' submissions, for instance, how many APis Microsoft's Office 
Suite currently exposes. 
166 Indeed, the District Court expressly found that there are other software applications with the 
potential to evolve into middleware. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at '1178. 
167 As Judge Easterbrook once noted when critiquing the "actual potential competition" doctrine 
applied under section 7 of the Clayton Act, proof that an acquiring firm would otherwise have entered a 
concentrated market de novo does not establish that the integration through acquisition in fact reduces 
future competition. There may well be other firms equally capable of entering the relevant market, with 
the result that elimination of one possible entrant will have no discernible effect on competition. "If 
there are many potential competitors . . . the removal of one of them cannot be important, since the 
continued presence of the remaining firms will discipline the market to the same extent. The removed 
firm must have had, then, some unique qualities for its potential competition to have been effective." 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Toehold Acquisitions and the Potential Competition Doctrine, 40 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 156, 169 (1972). 
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according to the government the existence of one successful middleware 
firm would bring down the applications barrier. 168 
Ironically, the government supplied an argument and supporting evi-
dence that undermines its assertion that Microsoft's failure to transform its 
Office Suite into middleware materially affects the nature and extent of the 
applications barrier. In particular, the government argues that "there are 
several new desktop applications that could become important middleware 
technologies."169 The existence of these various technologies counsels in 
favor of a behavioral remedy banning Microsoft from tying or binding its 
own version of these technologies to Windows 98 or successor operating 
systems. 170 The district court apparently agreed and enjoined Microsoft 
from tying or binding its operating system to such applications. 171 
The ban on contractually tying or technologically "binding" middle-
ware to Windows or other operating systems may well be justified under 
current law as a prophylactic attempt to prevent Microsoft from "forcing" 
consumers to purchase a software application that they may not otherwise 
prefer. 172 Regardless, the government's case for such behavioral relief de-
pends upon an assertion that Office Suite is by no means the only software 
application that is capable of evolving into middleware. If the government 
is correct on this score, then Microsoft's refusal to divest its Office Suite 
application cannot be said to materially impact competition. 
D. Does the Possibility that Disintegration Will Lower the Application 
Barrier Justify Relief? 
I do not mean to suggest that the government's case for disintegrating 
Microsoft is entirely baseless. It is certainly possible that Microsoft's anti-
168 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgment at 34, United States v. Micro-
soft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (No 98-1232). 
169 /d. at 28. Indeed, the government cites favorably an internal Microsoft document stating that 
one of these applications, Real Networks "is just like Netscape[]" in its capacity to evolve into middle-
ware. !d. 
170 !d. at 42. 
171 Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 68. 
172 It should be noted that, even under current tying law, the prohibition of contractual tying and 
technological binding is overbroad in one respect, as it treats as a separate product any middleware that 
Microsoft has "distributed separately from an Operating System Product in the retail channel or through 
Internet access providers, Internet content providers, ISVs or OEMs ... . "Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 
72 (defining "Middleware Product" for purposes of final judgment). As I have argued elsewhere, the 
mere fact that a firm distributes an item in separate channels does not ipso facto establish the existence 
of a "separate demand" as Jefferson Parish employs that concept. Ford may well sell automobile en-
gines in channels separate from its automotive dealerships. This does not establish the existence of a 
"separate demand" for automobiles and the engines they contain, however. Meese, Monopoly Bundling, 
supra note I 05, at 96 n.l 02 (refuting government's assertion that separate marketing of tied product 
establishes separate demand). The question under the separate demand test is not whether the purported 
tied item is ever sold without the purported tying item. Instead, the question is whether the purportedly 
tying product is sold separately. 
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competitive actions prevented Netscape from remammg the "standard" 
internet browser. It is also possible that, as such, Netscape or Java would 
have evolved into the sort of rniddleware that could lower the applications 
barrier to entry. Finally, it is possible that an independent AppCo would 
successfully transform the Microsoft Office Suite into middleware, that 
such middleware would lower the application barrier to entry, and that no 
other software application would evolve into middleware. Antitrust law, 
however, is generally concerned with probabilities, and there has been no 
showing or finding that the overall scenario suggested by the government is 
probable. Mere "ephemeral possibilities" are generally not sufficient to 
justify the undoing of voluntary integration.173 
Why is it, though, that mere possibility is not enough? After all, the 
government did prove that Microsoft possesses monopoly power, power 
that presumably reduces consumer welfare each day that it is exercised. If 
there is any possibility that disintegration is necessary and sufficient to 
ameliorate that power, one might argue, the district court should order a 
break up. There is, it seems, no harm in trying. 
This, in fact, seems to be the government's attitude toward the remedy 
question. For, according to the government, the vertical disintegration of 
Microsoft will not harm the firm in the least and may even produce benefits 
for its shareholders in the long run. 174 Thus, the government apparently 
believes that the current structure of Microsoft, entailing as it does common 
ownership of Windows 98 and various applications, reflects a random as-
signment of related economic tasks to a single firm-Microsoft-tasks that 
173 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962) (finding section 7 con-
cerned with "probabilities," not mere "ephemeral possibilities"); Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 
354 (2d Cir. 1982) (mere "ephemeral possibility" that acquiring firm would otherwise have entered the 
market de novo would not support a case under the actual potential competition doctrine). 
174 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgment at 37, Microsoft (No. 98-
1232). The government's assertion that the coerced disintegration of Microsoft will actually enhance 
shareholder value is difficult to credit in light of the fierce resistance that the firm has offered to the 
plan. The government's entire case on the merits is premised upon a characterization of Microsoft as a 
far-sighted profit-maximizing firm which intentionally set out to protect and even enhance its profits by 
thwarting competitive challenges well before they emerged. Presumably a firm this rational is able to 
determine for itself whether divestiture of the applications business as defined by the government would 
in fact enhance shareholder value. 
Relying upon one unsupported paragraph in an expert affidavit, the government asserts that 
coerced disintegrations, such as the breakup of Standard Oil, have produced net benefits for the share-
holders of the disintegrated firms. /d. at 37. The paragraph on which the government relies is hedged 
somewhat, stating, as it does, that "court ordered separations such as the Standard Oil and the 1984 
AT&T break-ups are perceived as having produced sizable positive returns to shareholders, assuming 
they held on to their original shareholdings." Affidavit of Robert F. Greenhill & Jeffrey P. Williams at~ 
55, Microsoft (No. 98-1232), available at http://www.naag.org/features/microsoft/remedies/greenhill. 
pdf (emphasis added). The affidavit does not explain just how one could determine how much shares in 
Standard Oil would have been worth had the firm remained intact after 1911. Without such (unknow-
able) information, it would seem difficult to support the affidavit's assertion. At any rate, any affidavit 
that assumes that John D. Rockefeller did not know how to maximize his own income should be viewed 
with suspicion. 
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could just as readily be divided among any number of other firms.I 75 In-
deed, taken to its logical conclusion, the government's position would sup-
port division of Microsoft into several application companies, each of 
which, presumably could be a potential author ofmiddleware.I 76 
We are thus brought back to where this Article started: the presump-
tion that ownership integration-like other forms of integration-is pro-
competitive and beneficial. In free societies, such integration reflects a vol-
untary decision about how to organize assets, a decision that normally rests 
upon actors' assessments of the relative costs of alternative forms of or-
ganization. Microsoft must believe that common ownership of Windows 
and the Office Suite, for instance is procompetitive. Indeed, the govern-
ment's case for disintegration is premised upon Office Suite's "domi-
nance."I77 Is it really a coincidence that the same firm that produced the 
most popular operating system has also produced the most popular bundle 
of word processing software?178 The government seems to think so. 
The government's assumption that the common ownership of Win-
dows and related applications produces no benefits is just one more mani-
festation of the inhospitality tradition that the government embraced with 
so much fervor at trial. 179 Indeed, once one assumes that there is no distinc-
tion from an efficiency perspective between cooperation through ownership 
and cooperation by contract "on the open market," there is no reason not to 
disintegrate Microsoft or, for that matter, the Rolling Stones, Skadden Arps 
175 It may be that the extent of integration varies greatly among firms. Some firms make only 
operating systems, some make only word processing software, some make only browsers, at least one 
one (IBM) makes an operating system and word processing software and at least one (Microsoft) makes 
all three. To some, this great variation may suggest that any firm can be "successful" with less (or more) 
integration. In fact, however, the varying degrees of integration exhibited by different firms likely 
reflect characteristics that are unique to each firm, characteristics that have led each firm to a unique 
amount and type of integration. F. A. HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in INDIVIDUALISM AND 
ECONOMIC ORDER 101-02 (1948) ("[I]n conditions of real life the position even of any two producers is 
hardly ever the same .... At any given moment the equipment of a particular firm is always largely 
determined by historical accident, and the problem is that it should make the best use of the given 
equipment (including the acquired capacities of the members of its staff) and not what it should do if it 
were given unlimited time to adjust itself to constant conditions."). 
176 Both Internet Explorer and Microsoft Office, for instance, are presumably potential authors of 
middleware. As such, there is no apparent reason, again under the logic invoked by the government, to 
allow these two applications to remain under common ownership. 
177 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. 
178 The government may believe that the success of Word and the Office Suite is somehow due to 
Microsoft's power in the operating system market, and not a reflection of a superior word processing 
application. It has not, however, mentioned this possibility in its argument in favor of disintegration. 
Indeed, proof that the Office Suite's large market share is the result of Microsoft's anticompetitive 
tactics would itself undermine the case for disintegration, as it would undermine the government's 
assumption that an independent AppCo's Office Suite will retain its dominance indefinitely, without the 
assistance of the OpCo. Absent such proof, one is compelled to assume that the current success of Word 
and the Office Suite is in part due to the legitimate fruits of ownership integration. 
179 See supra notes 175-76. 
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or Exxon-Mobil. 180 
The inhospitality tradition holds little sway, except in Washington, 
D.C. This does not mean that the ownership integration of Windows and 
Office Suite, for instance, was beneficial; it could, conceivably, be benign 
or even harmful. Presumptions can be rebutted, and the government was 
free to rebut the presumption that the current structure of Microsoft is eco-
nomically superior to that which the government is attempting to engineer. 
The government chose not to, however, relying instead upon generalized 
assertions that contractual integration was economically equivalent or even 
superior to the continued existence of a unified Microsoft. 181 For instance, 
the government did not address in any meaningful fashion Microsoft's as-
sertion that ownership integration would reduce the cost associated with 
generating and acquiring information about the interaction between the 
operating system and various applications. 182 Instead, the government's 
expert simply stated-in a couple of sentences-that Microsoft did and 
could communicate with ISVs, such as the future AppCo, across corporate 
boundaries. 183 Neither the government nor its expert considered the possi-
bility, recognized in literature regarding the theory of the firm, that intra-
firm communication is superior to that which takes place "across corporate 
boundaries."184 This failure to recognize, or even consider, the efficiency 
advantages of alternative forms of integration is, of course, yet another 
manifestation of the inhospitality tradition, which rested upon an assump-
tion that a firm can costlessly produce, gather, and transmit information to 
other firms. 185 Without some real showing that these and other efficiencies 
180 Judge Easterbrook summarized a similar attitude taken by courts influenced by the inhospital-
ity tradition. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 6 ("When the defendant lacks a powerful explanation for its 
conduct, and the evidence points to 'exclusion,' a judge is likely to conclude: 'why not prohibit this 
practice? If it is anticompetitive, the prohibition will be beneficial. If it is not anticompetitive, the prohi-
bition will be harmless; the defendant cannot tell me why the practice is essential to efficiency."). 
181 See Declaration of Carl Shapiro at 11-13, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 
(D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232), available at http://www.naag.org/features/microsoftlremedies/afidavits. 
htm. 
182 See Declaration of Stanley Liebowitz, at ~~ 20-22, Microsoft (No. 98-1232), available at 
http://www .neramicrosoft. com/level_ I /nera_tt.htm. 
183 See Declaration of Carl Shapiro at 13. 
184 See, e.g., Scott Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181 (1988) (arguing 
that the institution of a firm allows for greater control over employees and the information they possess 
or might obtain during their employment). 
185 Professor Richard Langlois colorfully describes the unrealistic epistemological assumptions of 
price theory, the economic paradigm that informed the inhospitality tradition: 
Standard price theory partakes of the epistemology of old spy movies, in which 
complete knowledge of how to build and launch an ICBM could somehow be tran-
scribed onto a microdot and hidden under a postage stamp .... In the world of tacit 
knowledge, [however,] having the same blueprints as one's competitors is unlikely 
to translate into having the same costs of production. 
RICHARD LANGLOIS, TRANSACTION COSTS, PRODUCTION COSTS, AND THE PASSAGE OF TIME, in 
COASEAN ECONOMICS: LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS II (Steven 
G. Medema ed., 1998). See also WILLIAMSON, supra note 20, at 370-73 (describing link between price 
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of integration are illusory, there is no cause for disintegrating Microsoft 
based simply on the "off chance" that such integration could ultimately 
introduce competition in middleware.I 86 
CONCLUSION 
Voluntary integration in a free market is presumptively beneficial, and 
the United States has not asserted that this presumption is inapplicable 
where Microsoft is concerned. Nonetheless, the government has sought to 
disintegrate Microsoft, claiming that fission of this successful firm may 
lead to the emergence of middleware and the ultimate demise of the so-
called applications barrier to entry. Given the presumptive benefits of vol-
untary integration, such extraordinary relief should only issue after a find-
ing that: 1) Microsoft's unlawful tactics actually raised or maintained the 
applications barrier to entry and 2) an independent AppCo would be the 
only firm that would probably introduce middleware in the foreseeable fu-
ture. 
The district court made neither such finding at the trial or remedy 
stage. Ironically, the government's own trial strategy is largely responsible 
for the lack of factual support for the remedy it seeks. By relying upon 
outmoded doctrines associated with the inhospitality tradition of antitrust, 
the government relieved itself of any burden of showing that Microsoft's 
tactics actually harmed competition in the manner asserted. Absent addi-
tional proceedings and further findings, Microsoft should remain intact. 
theory and the inhospitality tradition of antitrust). 
I86 Nor did the government (or Microsoft) consider a second possibility, namely, that ownership 
integration could obviate the transaction costs that might accompany the design of complementary 
operating systems. For instance, the OpCo could make sunk investments in software designs that are 
specific to expected designs by the AppCo. Once the OpCo makes these investments, it could be vul-
nerable to opportunistic behavior by the AppCo, which could exploit the OpCo's investments by seek-
ing to alter the terms of the relationship when it has the OpCo over a barrel. Complete vertical integra-
tion could reduce the prospect of such opportunistic behavior. Cf WILLIAMSON, supra note 20, at 114-
115 (arguing that complete integration can obviate the transaction costs produced when exchange re-
quires investment in specialized assets). 
